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Do Banks Price their Informational Monopoly?
Abstract
Modern corporate ﬁnance theory argues that although bank monitoring is beneﬁcial to
borrowers, it also allows banks banks to use the private informationthey gain through mon-
itoring to “hold-up” borrowers for higher interest rates. In this paper, we seek empirical
evidence for this information hold-up cost. Since new information about a ﬁrm’s credit-
worthiness is revealed at the time of its ﬁrst issue in the public bond market, it follows that
after ﬁrms undertake their bond IPO, banks with an exploitable information advantage
will be forced to adjust their loan interest rates downwards, particularly for ﬁrms that are
revealed to be safe. Our ﬁndings show that ﬁrms are able to borrow from banks at lower
interest rates after they issue for the ﬁrst time in the public bond market and that the
magnitude of these savings is larger for safer ﬁrms. We further ﬁnd that among safe ﬁrms,
those that get their ﬁrst credit rating at the time of their bond IPO beneﬁt from larger in-
terest rate savings than those that already had a credit rating when they entered the bond
market. Since more information is revealed at the time of the bond IPO on the former ﬁrms
and since this information will increase competition from uninformed banks, these ﬁndings
provide support for the hypothesis that banks price their informational monopoly. Finally,
we ﬁnd that while entering the public bond market may reduce these informational rents,
it is costly to ﬁrms because they have to pay higher underwriting costs on their IPO bonds.
Moreover, IPO bonds are subject to more underpricing than subsequent bonds when they
ﬁrst trade in the secondary bond market.1 Introduction
It is now well established in the modern theory of corporate ﬁnance that there are both
beneﬁts and costs to relying on bank debt. As formulated by Rajan (1992), banks have
more incentive than dispersed “arm’s length” debtholders to monitor borrowers. However, the
private information that banks gain through monitoring allows them to “hold up” borrowers
— if a borrower seeks to switch banks, it may be pegged as a “lemon” regardless of its true
ﬁnancial condition.1 In this paper, we seek empirical evidence for this informational hold-up
cost by comparing banks’ loan pricing policies before and after borrowers gain access to public
debt markets. Access to these marketsgives us an opportunity to detect the informationalrents
because it reveals new information about ﬁrms, thereby reducing the informational advantage
of incumbent banks. Our evidence suggests that banks do price their informational advantage
and that informational rents are economically signiﬁcant.
Earlyattempts to investigatethe importance of the hold-up problem, including Houston
and James (1996) and Farinha and Santos (2002), focused on ﬁrms’ choices of funding sources.
These studies build on the idea that if the hold-up problem is a concern, then it is likely
to be more costly for ﬁrms with many growth opportunities. These ﬁrms are more likely
to select funding choices that reduce their exposure to the hold-up costs.2 More recently,
researchers, including Santos and Winton (2007) and Schenone (2007), started to consider
bank loan pricing policies to investigate the importance of the hold-up problem more directly.3
Our paper is closer to the latter literature in that we consider bank loan pricing policies to
investigate the importance of the hold-up problem, but we adopt a novel approach, focusing
on how these policies vary with ﬁrms’ bond IPOs.
Our departing point is the following: When a ﬁrm issues for the ﬁrst time in the public
bond market, new information about the ﬁrm’s creditworthiness is made public. This new
1Rajan in turn builds on works by Diamond (1984), who models the monitoring advantages of bank loans
over arm’s-length debt, and Sharpe (1990), who models the informational hold-up aspect of bank loans.
2Using data from U.S. public ﬁrms, Houston and James (1996) ﬁnd supporting evidence for this idea: Firms
with a single bank relationship tend to rely less on bank debt as growth opportunities increase: however, the
opposite is true for ﬁrms with multiple bank relationships. Farinha and Santos (2002) also ﬁnd supporting
evidence for that idea. Using data from Portuguese private ﬁrms, they ﬁnd that nearly all ﬁrms start out
borrowing from a single bank, but as they grow older, those with more growth opportunities are more likely to
switch to multiple bank relationships. For further references, see the surveys by Boot (2000) and Ongena and
Smith (2000).
3Schenone (2007) investigates the importance of hold-up costs by comparing the impact of lending-
relationship intensity on loan spreads before and after ﬁrms’ equity IPOs. Santos and Winton (2007), in
turn, investigate the importance of informational hold-up costs by comparing the interest rates banks charge on
their loans to bank-dependent and non-bank-dependent borrowers over the business cycle.
1information arises from the documents ﬁrms have to disclose for their SEC registration, the
documents investment banks publicize in their placement eﬀorts, the scrutiny of bond analysts
and bond investors, and the credit ratings assigned by rating agencies. We pay particular
attention to credit ratings because there is evidence that rating agencies produce valuable
information on ﬁrms and, as we will show, the vast majority of ﬁrms get their ﬁrst credit
rating at the time they issue their ﬁrst public bond.4
To build our main hypothesis, we consider Rajan’s (1992) result that incumbent banks
are able to extract more informationalrents from riskier borrowers than from safer ones because
outside banks are less willing to bid on loans to borrowers that are perceived to be riskier.
Speciﬁcally, we hypothesize that the information about the riskiness of ﬁrms that is made
public at the time of the bond IPO increases outside banks’ willingness to bid on loans to
ﬁrms, in particular to ﬁrms that are revealed to be safe. As a result, informational rents
should decline following a ﬁrm’s bond IPO, particularly for those ﬁrms that are identiﬁed at
the time of the bond IPO to be safe. To illustrate, consider a setting in which prior to the
bond IPO, incumbent banks know the true risk of each ﬁrm, while outside banks know only
the distribution of ﬁrm risk. After the bond IPO, ﬁrms that are identiﬁed by new information
as relatively safe should be able to attract more competition from outside banks and therefore
beneﬁt from a decline in the informationalrents they pay to their incumbent banks. In contrast,
ﬁrms that are identiﬁed as being risky will not entice the same competition and as a result
should not beneﬁt from a similar decline in informational rents.
To test this hypothesis, we compare bank loan spreads that ﬁrms pay before and after
they undertake their bond IPOs and investigate how the diﬀerence between these spreads
varies with the risk level of the ﬁrm as deﬁned by the credit rating of its IPO bond — the
new source of information on ﬁrm creditworthiness — controlling for a number of loan- and
ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors. To this end, we ﬁrst identify the ﬁrms in Compustat for which we have
information on bond IPOs. We limit our analysis to Compustat ﬁrms because we want to
have accounting information on ﬁrms both before and after they undertake their bond IPOs.
Therefore, our study is about publicly listed ﬁrms, since Compustat has data only on ﬁrms
that have publicly traded equity. This selection criteria does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect our sample
of bond IPO ﬁrms since the vast majority of ﬁrms choose to list their equity ﬁrst and, only
after that, start issuing in the public bond market.5 Furthermore, since there will be less
4This is partly due to Moody’s and S&P’s policy of rating public corporate bond issuers even when issuing
ﬁrms do not apply for their ratings. See Liu and Thakor (1984), Ederington, Yawitz, and Roberts (1987), and
Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992) for evidence that rating agencies produce valuable information on ﬁrms.
5For example, during our sample period (1972-2002), while 1,427 ﬁrms issued their ﬁrst public bond after
their equity IPO, only 76 ﬁrms did both IPOs in reverse order.
2incremental information revealed at the time of the bond IPO for publicly listed ﬁrms than
for privately held ﬁrms, relying on the former sample should bias the results against ﬁnding
evidence of banks’ monopolistic loan pricing behavior.
We identify ﬁrms’ bond IPOs by selecting the ﬁrst public bond of each ﬁrm in the
Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database.6 Since the SDC’s database starts in 1970, we
limit our sample to ﬁrms that ﬁrst appeared in Compustat after 1969 to minimize the misclas-
siﬁcation problem that arises with ﬁrms that issued public bonds prior to 1970. Finally, we
merge these ﬁrms with Loan Pricing Corporation’s Dealscan database to get information on
ﬁrms’ loans before and after they undertake their bond IPOs.
We ﬁnd that ﬁrms pay lower spreads on their bank loans after they undertake their
bond IPOs. As we expected, these interest rate savings are more pronounced for ﬁrms that are
identiﬁed to be more creditworthy at the time of the bond IPO. Everything else equal, ﬁrms
that enter the public bond market with a bond that is rated investment grade beneﬁt from a
reduction of 35 to 50 basis points in the credit spreads they pay on their bank loans, depending
on speciﬁcation and the sample. In contrast, ﬁrms that enter the bond market with a bond
that is rated below investment grade beneﬁt from a reduction of only 5 to 20 basis points on
their loan spreads. These ﬁndings are consistent with the hypothesis that banks do price their
informational advantage when they extend loans to borrowers.
Our analysis relies on some important assumptions. One assumption is that the change
in creditworthiness of safe ﬁrms at the time of their bond IPO is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from the change in creditworthiness of risky ﬁrms at the time of their bond IPO. However,
it is possible that ﬁrms getting loan ﬁnancing after the bond IPO, in particular those that
enter the bond market with a bond that is rated investment grade, are safer. This concern
is mitigated in our analysis: First, we include ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects that would absorb any time-
invariant diﬀerences across ﬁrms. Second, we use a set of proxies for ﬁrms’ credit risk to
control for changes in ﬁrms’ creditworthiness from the time before the bond IPO to the time
after the bond IPO that could aﬀect loan spreads. Thus, the eﬀect of bond IPO that we ﬁnd
is conditional on ﬁrms’ credit risk.
Another assumption of our analysis is that a ﬁrm’s decision to enter the public bond
market is exogenous. In reality, this decision is likely to be endogenous, depending on ﬁrm-
speciﬁc variables and, possibly, the conditions of the bond market. We use a matched-sample
approach to control for the potential endogeneity of the set of ﬁrms that issue public bonds
and the timing of their bond IPOs. Our results remain qualitatively unchanged.
6In our identiﬁcation of IPO bonds, we did not consider Rule 144a bonds as public bonds because ﬁrms do
not have to disclose the as much information when they issue these bonds because they can only be traded
among qualiﬁed investors.
3Finally, our test of the importance of the hold-up problem relies on the assumption
that new information about ﬁrms’ creditworthiness is revealed at the time of its bond IPO
and that this information leads to reduction in the spreads on bank loans that ﬁrms take out
after their bond IPO. We realize that there might be other mechanisms through which bond
IPOs may lead to a decline in bank loan spreads. In particular, although there are important
diﬀerences between bond ﬁnancing and bank funding, ﬁrms that gain access to the former are
likely to use it as a bargaining tool in their loan negotiations. Thus, entry to the public bond
market could lead to a reduction in loan spreads for reasons other than a decline in incumbent
banks’ informational rents. Therefore, we conduct further tests to conﬁrm that our ﬁndings
indeed reﬂect the change in informational rents due to bond IPOs.
Consistent with our assumption that new information is revealed at the time of the
bond IPO, we ﬁnd that the vast majorityof ﬁrms get their ﬁrst credit rating at the time of their
bond IPO. We take advantage of the presence of ﬁrms that already had a credit rating at the
time of their bond IPO to isolate the eﬀect of bond IPOs on incumbent banks’ informational
rents from other eﬀects that borrowers’ access to the bond market may have on banks’ loan
pricing policies. Speciﬁcally, we repeat our regression analysis, allowing the impact of the bond
IPO on loan spreads to be diﬀerent for ﬁrms that had credit ratings before their bond IPO
compared to ﬁrms that get their ﬁrst credit rating at the time of the bond IPO. Our results
show that among safe ﬁrms, those that get their ﬁrst rating at the time of the bond IPO
beneﬁt from a larger decline in loan interest rates than those that were already rated when
they entered the bond market. Since more information is revealed at the time of the bond
IPO on those ﬁrms that get their ﬁrst credit rating at that time and since this information
will likely increase competition from uninformed banks to ﬁrms that become known to be safe,
these ﬁndings provide support to the hypothesis that banks do indeed price their informational
monopoly.7
Our study only considers borrowers that have publicly traded equity. Since there is
more information available on these ﬁrms, our ﬁndings suggest that privately held ﬁrms that do
not have credit ratings are likely to face even higher costs from relying on bank ﬁnance. In this
regard, the paper by Schenone (2006) is complementary to ours. Schenone (2006) investigates
the importance of the hold-up costs by comparing the impact of lending relationship intensity
on loan spreads before and after ﬁrms’ equity IPOs. Since new information about a ﬁrm is
likely to be revealed with its equity IPO, bank information rents should decline afterwards.
Schenone ﬁnds that the impact of lending relationship intensity on loan spreads declines after
7In contrast, among the risky ﬁrms, we ﬁnd that there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the interest rate
savings of ﬁrms that had and that did not have credit ratings before their bond IPOs. Data limitations, however,
do not allow us to fully investigate this relationship for risky ﬁrms.
4the IPO, suggesting that switching costs and information rents decline after the equity IPO.
While we focus on bond IPOs of listed ﬁrms, Schenone focuses on ﬁrms’ equity IPOs, which are
likely to have a bigger impact on the amount of information available about ﬁrms. However,
because limited information is available about pre-equity IPO ﬁrms, she is restricted in the
ﬁrm controls she can account for in her analysis.
Our ﬁnding that ﬁrms are able to beneﬁt from a reduction in the interest rates they
pay on the loans they take out after their bond IPO raises an important question: Why is it
that only a relatively small number of ﬁrms choose to raise funding in the bond market? One
possible explanation is that it is costly to enter this market. Since it is costly to ﬂoat equity
because of the underpricing cost and the direct compensation ﬁrms pay underwriters, it may
very well be the case that it is also costly for ﬁrms to issue for the ﬁrst time in the public bond
market.8
Bond IPOs are diﬀerent from equity IPOs, but some of the reasons researchers have put
forward to explain the underpricing of equity IPOs are also likely to lead to the underpricing
of bond IPOs.9 Entering the public bond market may be costly because of the compensation
ﬁrms have to pay the underwriters of their IPO bonds. Firms pay underwriters both for
the services they provide, including the production and the distribution of information, and
for the risk they carry in underwriting the ﬁrm’s securities. A lack of ﬁrm’s track record
in the public bond market coupled with the absence of credit ratings and coverage by bond
market analysts will make it more diﬃcult for underwriters to perform their services and pose
a greater risk to them when they underwrite IPO bonds, suggesting that ﬁrms will likely pay
higher underwriting costs when they issue their ﬁrst public bond.
We proceed by investigating whether it is costly for ﬁrms to enter the public bond
market by analyzing the compensation that ﬁrms pay underwriters and the underpricing of
their IPO bonds in the market. To this end, we analyze the gross spreads and ex ante credit
spreads of IPO bonds as well as the underpricing of these bonds by comparing their ex ante
yield spreads with their yield spreads when they ﬁrst trade in the bond market.10 The results
8According to Ritter (2003), the average initial return on equity IPOs ranges from 5% in Denmark to 257%
in China. As for the direct compensation that ﬁrms pay underwriters, Fernando, Gatchev, and Spindt (2004)
ﬁnd that it is higher for the IPO than for ﬁrms’ subsequent equity issues.
9Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Huang (1989) and Welch (1989), for example, show that when
issuing ﬁrms have private information about their value, underpricing may be a useful signaling device. Hughes
and Thakor (1992), in turn, show that equity underpricing may be an eﬃcient method to reduce the cost of
future class action lawsuits since only investors who lose money are entitled to damages, and Chemmanur (1993),
Aggarwal, Krigman, and Womack (2002), and Demmers and Lewellen (2003) show that ﬁrms may underprice
because they beneﬁt from the publicity that comes with a high ﬁrst-day return.
10Cai, Helwege, and Warga (2005) ﬁnd that IPO bonds are subject to more underpricing than bonds of
5of our investigation conﬁrm that it is costly to enter the public bond market. Firms pay higher
gross spreads on their IPO bonds than on the public bonds they issue afterwards. We do not
ﬁnd evidence that ﬁrms are compensated for these higher underwriting costs by obtaining from
underwriters a more favorable guaranteed price on their IPO bonds. Our investigation of bond
prices in the secondary market also shows that it is costly to enter the public bond market
because IPO bonds are subject to more underpricing than non-IPO bonds. Further, we ﬁnd
that the costs of entering the public bond market are more pronounced for ﬁrms that enter
with a bond that is rated below investment grade, but importantly they also aﬀect ﬁrms that
enter with a bond that is rated investment grade. These costs, therefore, may explain why
some ﬁrms, including those that are safe, choose not to enter the public bond market, despite
the advantages we ﬁnd of this decision on the cost of bank funding.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. The next section presents our
methodology and data, and characterizes our sample of bond IPO ﬁrms. Section 3 investigates
the eﬀect of bond IPOs on the interest ratesﬁrms pay on their bank loans. Section 4 investigates
our hypothesis that there is new information on ﬁrms revealed at the time of the bond IPO,
and section 5 investigates the cost of entering the public bond market. Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2 Methodology, data, and sample characterization
2.1 Methodology
The methodology we use in this paper has three parts. The ﬁrst part investigateswhether ﬁrms
are able to borrow from banks at lower interest rates after they enter the public bond market.
The second part attempts to ﬁnd supporting evidence for our hypothesis that this decline in
loan interest rates is at least in part attributable to the information on ﬁrm’s creditowrthiness
revealed at the time of its bond IPO. The last part of our methodology investigates whether
it is costly for ﬁrms to enter the public bond market. We describe next the tests we use to
investigate each of these issues.
seasoned issuers, which supports the idea that it is costly to enter the public bond market, but they do not
investigate the underwriting costs ﬁrms incur to get the services of investment banks. Gande, Puri, Saunders,
and Walter (1997) and Gande, Puri, and Saunders (1999), in turn, ﬁnd that IPO bonds carry higher gross
spreads and ex ante credit spreads than bonds of seasoned issuers, but they unveil these results based on pooled
regressions, making it unclear whether the pricing diﬀerences they detect for IPO bonds are ﬁrm-speciﬁc or
driven by diﬀerences in unobserved ﬁrm characteristics.
62.1.1 The eﬀect of the bond IPO on the cost of bank lending
In this part, we investigate whether ﬁrms’ entry to the public bond market lowers the interest
rates they pay on their bank loans. To that end, we estimate the following model of loan
spreads:
LOAN SPREADijt = αi + β AFTER IPOijt + F 0
it−1 γ + L 0
ijt θ + O 0
it−1 µ + ￿ijt, (1)
where LOAN SPREADijt is the all-in-drawn spread over Libor at issue date for loan j issued
to ﬁrm i in year t. This is a standard measure of loan pricing. AFTER IPO is a dummy
variable that takes the value 1 for the loans that ﬁrm i takes out after it undertakes its bond
IPO. In some speciﬁcations, we replace this dummy variable with AFTER IGRADE IPO
and AFTER BGRADE IPO, which take the value 1 for the loans extended after the IPO
of ﬁrms that enter the bond market with an investment grade and below grade rated bond,
respectively. We consider these speciﬁcations to investigate our hypothesis that safer ﬁrms are
likely to beneﬁt from a larger reduction in their loan interest rates following their bond IPO
than riskier ﬁrms.
We estimate the eﬀect of entering the public bond market on loan spreads, controlling
for a set of ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables, F, a set of loan-speciﬁc variables, L, and a set of other
controls, O. We discuss these sets of controls next, starting with our ﬁrm variables. One
subset of these variables, which includes AGE, the ﬁrm’s age in years, and ASSETS, the
ﬁrm’s real assets (in millions of 1980 dollars computed with the CPI deﬂator), attempts to
control for the ﬁrm’s overall risk. A subset of these variables attempts to control for the risk of
the ﬁrm’s debt. It includes the ﬁrm’s ROA, the return on assets (net income divided by assets);
INTEREST COV, the interest coverage, which is a more direct measure of the ﬁrm’s ability
to service debt (EBITDA divided by interest expense); LEVERAGE, the leverage ratio (debt
over total assets); and EARNINGS V OL, the earnings volatility (the standard deviation of
the ﬁrm’s quarterly return on assets over the last three years). The next subset of variables,
which includes TANGIBLES, the ﬁrm’s tangible assets (inventories plus plant, property,
and equipment over total assets), and ADV ERTISING + R&D, the ﬁrm’s expenses with
advertising and R&D scaled by the ﬁrm’s sales, in turn, controls for the size and quality of the
asset base that debt holders can draw on in default.11 We also control for INVESTMENTS,
the ﬁrm’s investments scaled by its assets, to proxy for the value the ﬁrm is expected to gain
by future growth.12 Last, we control for the ﬁrm’s industry as deﬁned by its 1-digit SIC code
11Given that tangible assets lose less of their value in default than do intangible assets such as brand equity,
we expect the former variable to have a negative eﬀect on spreads and the latter one to possibly have a positive
eﬀect on spreads.
12Although growth opportunities are vulnerable to ﬁnancial distress, we already have controls for the tangi-
7because each industry may face additional risks that are not captured by the list of control
variables presented above.
Our next set of controls attempts to account for those loan features that are likely
to aﬀect loan spreads. This set includes the loan amount in 1980 dollars, AMOUNT; the
loan maturity in years, MATURITY ; dummy variables for secured loans, SECURED, se-
nior loans, SENIOR, loans to borrowers that face dividend restrictions in connection with
the loan, DIV IDEND REST, loans to borrowers with a guarantor, GUARANTOR, and
loans to borrowers with a sponsor, SPONSOR. Included in this set are also dummy vari-
ables for loan renewals, RENEWAL, and for syndicated loans, SY NDICATED. Lastly, we
also included in this set dummy variables to control for the loan purpose (corporate pur-
pose, CORPORATE PURP; repay an existing debt, REFINANCE; ﬁnance a takeover,
TAKEOV ER; and working capital purpose, WORKING CAP) and dummy variables to con-
trol for the type of the loancontract (line of credit, CREDIT LINE;term loan, TERM LOAN;
and bridge loan, BRIDGE LOAN).
The last set of variables in our loan pricing model attempts to control for other factors
that are likely to aﬀect loan spreads. Following the evidence that lending relationships aﬀect
loan interest rates, we control for the ﬁrm’s relationship with the lead bank in the syndicate by
including the variable LRELATIONSHIP, which takes the value 1 if the ﬁrm borrowed from
the bank in the last year.13 Since the conditions in the bond market may aﬀect the interest
rates banks charge borrowers, we control for the slope of the bond yield curve by including
the diﬀerence in the yields of new bonds rated BBB and those rated AAA, BBBSPREAD.
We also control for changes in the level of the interest rate used to compute the loan spreads
by including in our models LIBOR, the level of the Libor. Last, we include a time trend
TIME TREND to account for a potential secular decline in loan interest rates.
We estimate our models after we limit the sample of the post bond IPO loans to those
loans ﬁrms take out in the year immediately after they enter the bond market in an attempt to
isolate the eﬀects of the bond IPO from other developments that could aﬀect the cost of bank
credit for these ﬁrms. We also report the results when we consider all of the loans the ﬁrm
takes out after its bond IPO. Since loan controls may be jointly determined with loan spreads,
we estimate our models of loan spreads both with and without the set of loan controls. Since
loan spreads may vary across ﬁrms, we estimate our models with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects.
Finally, in order to mitigate the potential impact of the endogeneity of ﬁrms’ bond IPO
bility of book value assets. Thus, this variable could have a negative eﬀect on spreads if it represents additional
value (over and above book value) that debt holders can in part access in the event of default.
13See Petersen and Rajan (1994), Berger and Udell (1995) and Santos and Winton (2007) for evidence on the
importance of a lending relationship on loan interest rates.
8decisions, we implement the matched sample methodology developed in the literature.14 To
create the sample of matched ﬁrms, we start with the full sample of ﬁrms and estimate the
probit model of the probability of issuing an IPO bond in any given year, using as explanatory
variables a set of ﬁrm characteristics described above. We construct the propensity score for
each ﬁrm in each year as a predicted probability of bond IPO. Using this propensity score,
we use radius matching to match IPO ﬁrms (the treatment group) with non–IPO ﬁrms (the
control group) that have similar propensity scores. We drop ﬁrms, both IPO and non–IPO,
that did not have close matches and ﬁrms for which the propensity score did not lie on the
common support of the bond IPO ﬁrms and non–IPO ﬁrms propensity score distribution. The
remaining ﬁrms constitute the matched sample for which we repeat our regression analysis
described above.
2.1.2 The importance of the information revealed at the time of the bond IPO
The second part of our methodology attempts to ﬁnd supporting evidence for our hypothesis
that new information on ﬁrms’ creditworthiness revealed at the time of the bond IPO is a
contributing factor to the decline in loan interest rates that we detect in the ﬁrst part of our
methodology. Even though the vast majority of ﬁrms get their ﬁrst credit rating at the time
of their bond IPO, a small number of ﬁrms already have a credit rating at that time. We use
these two sets of ﬁrms to control for other potential eﬀects of bond IPOs on loan interest rates
and to test more closely the importance of the new information revealed at the time of the
bond IPO on the loan interest rates that borrowers pay afterwards.
Since rating agencies reveal new information about borrowers’ creditworthiness when
they announce their ratings, the information content disclosed at the time of the bond IPO
is likely to be larger for ﬁrms that get their ﬁrst rating at that time than for ﬁrms that had
a credit rating prior to their bond IPO. To identify the expected eﬀect of this diﬀerence in
information on the spreads of loans these ﬁrms take out after the bond IPO, one needs to take
into account that uninformed banks are willing to compete more aggressively to extend loans
to safer ﬁrms than to riskier ﬁrms. Under these conditions, we postulate that among ﬁrms that
were classiﬁed as safe by their bond IPO credit rating, those that were not rated previously
should get a larger decline in the interest rates on the loans they take out after bond IPO than
ﬁrms that already had a rating indicating that they were safe ﬁrms.
For ﬁrms that are rated as risky at the time of their bond IPO we should observe the
opposite pattern. Compared to ﬁrms that were known to be risky (because they already had a
credit rating with that information) those that are rated as risky for the ﬁrst time at the time
14See, for example, Mayhew and Mihov (2004).
9of the bond IPO may see a decline in incumbent banks willingness to bid for their loans after
the bond IPO. As a result, they should not enjoy the same decline in the interest rates in the
loans they take out after the bond IPO when compared to that piers that were already known
to be risky.
To test these hypotheses, we start by allowing for the eﬀect of the bond IPO on loan
spreads to vary depending on whether the ﬁrm had a rating before the bond IPO by inter-
acting the AFTER IGRADE IPO and AFTER BGRADE IPO dummy variables with the
RATED indicator which takes the value 1 for ﬁrms that already had a credit rating by the time
they undertook their bond IPO. Next, since ratings have a direct eﬀect on the loan spreads,
we limit our interaction terms to take on values of 1 only when the ﬁrm was rated investment
grade (below grade) before its bond IPO and it entered the bond market with a bond that
was also rated investment grade (below grade). We allow for the ﬁrms that had ratings before
their bond IPO but that do not ﬁt in the above categories, for example ﬁrms that were rated
below grade but entered the bond market with a bond rated investment grade or vice versa,
to have a diﬀerent eﬀect of their bond IPO on loan spreads.
A concern with the previous test is that it does not account for potential diﬀerences
that may exist between the rating of the ﬁrm and the rating of its IPO bond if both of these
ratings fall in the investment grade or speculative grade categories respectively. For example,
two ﬁrms that had an A credit rating, one may enter the bond market with a bond rated A
while the other may do it with a bond rated say AA. In our previous test both of these ﬁrms
are treated equally, which may bias our ﬁndings in the tests described above. To address this
concern we reﬁne our test by creating an indicator for those ﬁrms that were both rated BBB and
entered the bond market with a bond rated BBB, the most common rating in the investment
grade category, putting all the other ﬁrms that were previously rated investment grade into
a separate category. In addition, we added an indicator to isolate the previously unrated
ﬁrms that entered the bond market with a bond rated BBB from the remaining unrated ﬁrms
that entered the bond market with a bond rated investment grade. The coeﬃcients on these
variables are important to ascertain the validity of our assumption that new information on
ﬁrm credit worthiness revealed at the time of the bond IPO is a contributing factor to the
decline in the loan interest rates that we detect afterwards. Speciﬁcally, they tell us, ceteris
paribus, whether there is a diﬀerence in the interest rate eﬀect of the BBB-rated bond IPO for
ﬁrms that had a BBB rating before entering the bond market and for ﬁrms that were not rated
previously. We posit that if this diﬀerence exists, it is attributable to the new information that
is revealed about the ﬁrm’s creditworthiness at the time of its bond IPO in connection with its
credit rating. We attempted to design a similar test among the ﬁrms rated below investment
grade, but were unable to do so because there were not a suﬃcient number of BB-rated ﬁrms,
10the most common rating in the below grade category.
As in the ﬁrst part of our methodology, we estimate the regressions in this part of our
methodology controlling for the set of ﬁrm characteristics F and other controls O we described
above. Also, as before we include a set of year ﬁxed eﬀects and estimate our models with
ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. Last, as in our investigation of loan spreads, we report the results of this
investigation for the full sample of the ﬁrms as well as for the matched sample.
2.1.3 The cost of a bond IPO
The last part of our methodology investigates whether it is costly for ﬁrms to enter the public
bond market. To this end, we investigate the gross spreads and ex ante credit spreads of IPO
bonds as well as the underpricing of these bonds by comparing their ex ante yield spreads with
their yield spreads when they ﬁrst trade in the bond market. We think that it is important
to look at these three measures because they all aﬀect the cost of accessing the public bond
market and are potentially interrelated. For instance, underwriters may try to oﬀset the extra
costs of bringing IPO bonds to the market by raising their yields (and lowering the prices paid
to the issuers) in order to increase the probability that they will sell out these issues. Also, if
investors demand a higher yield to buy IPO bonds than equivalent bonds of seasoned issuers,
this will be reﬂected in the price that underwriters guarantee the issuers, adding to the cost of
ﬁrst accessing the public bond market.
Gross spreads
We use the following model to investigate if IPO bonds carry higher gross spreads.
GROSS SPREADijt = αi + β IPOijt + F 0
it−1 γ + B 0
ijt θ + O 0
ijt µ + ￿ijt, (2)
where GROSS SPREADijt is the gross spread of bond j issued by ﬁrm i in year t, measured
as the diﬀerence between the oﬀered amount and the proceeds to the issuer, expressed as a
percentage of the oﬀered amount (issue size). This is a standard measure of the costs of bond
issuance which is due to underwriters. IPO is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for
the IPO bonds. In some speciﬁcations, we add the dummy variable SECOND, which takes
the value 1 for the second public bond issued by our bond IPO ﬁrms, to investigate whether
underpricing persists beyond the IPO bond. Since we hypothesize that safer ﬁrms beneﬁt from
a larger reduction in loan spreads than riskier ﬁrms after the bond IPO, we also investigate
whether underpricing varies with the credit rating of the IPO bond. To this end we add to our
model a dummy variable IGRADE, which takes the value 1 for the investment-grade bonds,
and the interaction of this variable with our IPO variable.
11We investigate whether IPO bonds pay higher gross spreads controlling for the set of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables F, which we discussed above. These variables determine the risks of
the ﬁrm. These risks are important because they aﬀect the underwriter’s chances of success
and consequently the price the underwriter will charge the ﬁrm to bring its IPO bond to the
market.
We also control for a set of bond features, B, including the size of the issue, AMOUNT,
and the maturity of the issue, MATURITY, that are likely to aﬀect underwriting costs. If
economies of scale are prevalent in the underwriting business, we would expect larger issues to
pay lower underwriting costs. In contrast, the additional risk of longer maturity bonds may
lead banks to demand a higher compensation to underwrite these bonds.
In addition, we control for a set of other variables, O, known to aﬀect bond underwriting
costs. Following Yasuda’s (2004) ﬁnding that ﬁrms that have lending relationships with their
bond underwriters pay lower gross spreads, we include in our model BK RELATIONSHIP,
which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the bond IPO underwriter also acquired the
ﬁrm’s last private placement or extended to the ﬁrm its last loan prior to its IPO bond. Follow-
ing the ﬁnding of Livingston and Miller (2000), Yasuda (2004), and others, that underwriters
with better reputation charge lower bond underwriting fees, we control for the reputation of
the underwriter by adding to our model the variable BK MKT SHARE, which measures the
market share of the underwriter. Following Gande, Puri, and Saunders’ (1999) ﬁnding that
commercial banks’ entry to the bond underwriting business in the late 1980s lowered the costs
of bond underwriting, we include in our model the dummy variable AFTER 1988, which takes
the value 1 for the bonds issued in the period after 1988.15 Last, we include a dummy variable,
RECESSION, which takes the value 1 if the bond was issued during a recession, as the addi-
tional diﬃculties of placing bonds during recessions may lead underwriters to demand a higher
compensation from ﬁrms that issue during downturns, and a time trend, TIME TREND, to
control for a possible secular decline in gross spreads.
Since bond characteristics, B, may be jointly determined with the bond’s gross spreads,
we estimate our model of gross spreads with and without these controls. Also, because the
gross spreads on IPO bonds may vary across ﬁrms, we estimate our models with ﬁrm ﬁxed
eﬀects.
Ex ante credit spreads
15The restrictions in the Glass–Steagall Act, which prohibited commercial banks from oﬀering underwriting
services, began to erode in 1988 with the Fed’s permission for bank holding companies to oﬀer bond underwriting
services through a nonbank subsidiary.
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end we estimate the following model of ex ante credit spreads:
CREDIT SPREADijt = αi + β IPOijt + F0
it−1 ψ + B 0
ijt ν + O 0
ijt µ + ￿ijt, (3)
where CREDIT SPREADijt is the percentage point diﬀerence between the ex ante yield to
maturity of the bond j issued by ﬁrm i in year t and the yield on an equivalent maturity U.S.
Treasury bond. We estimate this model following the same approach and using the same set
of ﬁrm and bond controls that we used in our investigation of the gross spreads of bonds. We
expand the set of bond controls, though, to distinguish callable bonds, CALLABLE, bonds
with a sinking fund, SINKING FUND, shelf issues, SHELF, and bonds with a put option,
PUT OPTION, as these covenants aﬀect the risk of the bond and, consequently, its credit
spread.
Last, we account for a set of other variables, O, known to aﬀect bond credit spreads.
This set includes AAA Y IELD (Moody’s index on the yield of triple-A rated bonds) and
BBB −AAA SPREAD (diﬀerence between the Moody’s indexes of the yields of triple-A and
triple-B rated bonds) to account for the state of the bond market at the time of the debt IPO,
and TREASURY SLOPE (the diﬀerence between the yields of Treasuries with 30-year and 5-
year maturities) to account for the state of the economy at the time of the debt IPO. Following
the ﬁndings of Fama and French (1989), Santos (2006), and others, that recessions increase the
credit spreads of bonds, we include in our model the dummy variable RECESSION, which
takes the value 1 if the bond was issued during a recession. Following Fang’s (2004) ﬁnding
that reputable banks obtain lower ex ante yields on the bonds they underwrite, we control
for the market share of the underwriter, BK MKT SHARE, our proxy for bank reputation.
Since ﬁrms’ relationships with banks will likely alleviate information frictions and consequently
make it easier for underwriters to place these ﬁrms’ bonds, we include in this set of controls the
dummy variable BK RELATIONSHIP, which takes the value 1 if the bond IPO underwriter
also acquired the ﬁrm’s last private placement or extended the ﬁrm its last loan prior to its
IPO bond.
As in the case of the gross spreads, and for the same reasons, we estimate our model
of ex ante credit spreads with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. Further, we estimate this model with and
without bond controls.
Abnormal credit spreads
Finally, we investigates whether IPO bonds suﬀer from more underpricing than public bonds
of seasoned issuers. To this end, we estimate the following model:
ABN SPREADijt = c + β IPOijt + F0
it−1 ψ + B 0
ijt ν + O 0
ijt µ + ￿ijt, (4)
13where ABN SPREADijt is the percentage point diﬀerence between the ex ante yield spread
on the bond j issued by ﬁrm i in year t, and the secondary market yield spread on this bond
when it ﬁrst trades, provided this occurs within one month after the issuance date. These
spreads are computed over the Moody’s daily bond yield index with the same rating of the
bond.
We estimate this model following the same approach and controlling for the same set
of ﬁrm, bond, and other variables that we used in our model of ex ante credit spreads. Given
that our spreads are now computed over an index of bond yields with the same bond rating,
however, we do not control in this test for the yields of triple-A rated bonds, AAA Y IELD.
Since our data source on market yields starts only in the mid-1990s and because not all bonds
trade within one month after their issuance date (at least according to our data source), we do
not have enough observations to test whether the underpricing of bond IPOs is diﬀerent from
the underpricing of public bonds subsequently issued by the same ﬁrms. In other words, we
do not have enough observations to identify our key variables with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. For this
reason, when we investigate the underpricing of IPO bonds we rely only on pooled regressions.
2.2 Data
The data for this project come from several sources. We use the SDC Domestic New Bond
Issuances database to identify the nonﬁnancial ﬁrms that issued bonds in the United States
since 1970, and to select the ﬁrst nonconvertible public bond issued by these ﬁrms, that is, the
ﬁrm’s IPO bond.16 We also use this database to gather the information on bonds relevant to
our study, and to identify ﬁrms’ investment banking relationships with the underwriters of their
IPO bonds. We complement the information we gather from the SDC database with secondary
market bond prices from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) to
investigate whether IPO bonds are subject to more underpricing in the secondary market than
bonds of seasoned issuers.17
We use the Loan Pricing Corporation’s (LPC) Dealscan database to identify which
bond IPO ﬁrms borrow from banks during the sample period.18 We also use this database to
16This database contains information on virtually all public bonds issued in the United States since 1970.
17This database includes prices of all purchases and sales of publicly traded bonds by insurance companies
since 1995. Several researchers have used this database to investigate the pricing of bonds because it reports
secondary market prices, not trader quotes. See Campbell and Taksler (2003), Krishnan, Ritchken, and Thomson
(2005), and Cai, Helwege, and Warga (2005) for other studies of bond prices that use the NAIC data.
18This database contains information on some non-syndicated loans, but most of its entries are syndicated
loans. It goes as far back as the beginning of the 1980s. In the ﬁrst part of that decade the database has a
somewhat reduced number of entries, but its comprehensiveness has increased steadily over time.
14obtain information on the individual loans that these ﬁrms took out and to collect information
on the lending syndicate. Last, we rely on the LPC database to identify ﬁrms’ bank lending
relationships.
We use Compustat to gather information on ﬁrms’ balance sheets and to identify ﬁrms’
industries, as deﬁned by their 1-digit SIC codes. We exclude ﬁnancial ﬁrms and ﬁrms for which
our control variables are missing in Compustat. We also use Compustat to determine the age
of ﬁrms at time of their bond IPOs. We determine this age by subtracting the date when the
ﬁrm ﬁrst appeared in Compustat from the date when it issued its ﬁrst public bond.
We use data from the Center for Research on Securities Prices (CRSP) to link com-
panies and subsidiaries that are part of the same ﬁrm, and to link companies over time that
went through mergers, acquisitions, or name changes. We then use these links to merge the
LPC-SDC-Compustat-IBES databases.
Finally, we use the Moody’s yield indexes on seasoned corporate bonds to control
for pricing changes in the bond market, and we use the peaks and troughs identiﬁed by the
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Business Cycle Dating Committee to identify
the periods of recession during our sample period.19
2.3 Sample characterization
Table 1 characterizes our sample of ﬁrms. The top panel compares our sample of 817 bond
IPO ﬁrms the year before they issue their ﬁrst public bond with these same ﬁrms one year
after the IPO. The middle panel compares instead our sample of bond IPO ﬁrms at the end of
the sample period with a set of ﬁrms that by then had not yet undertaken their bond IPOs.
The bottom panel limits the same comparison the middle panel to our set of matched ﬁrms.
As we can see from the top panel of the table, immediately after ﬁrms’ entry to the
public bond market, their assets and sales grow signiﬁcantly. Bond IPOs seem to have a
negative impact on ﬁrms’ risk. These IPOs increase ﬁrms’ leverage and reduce their interest
coverage. They further increase these ﬁrms’ earnings volatility and lower their returns on
assets, though by amounts that are not statistically diﬀerent from zero.
Given these changes, our results in the middle panel of Table 1 showing that by the
end of the sample period bond IPO ﬁrms are larger (both in assets and sales) than ﬁrms which
had not yet undergone their bond IPOs is not surprising. In contrast with the changes we
detected at the time of the bond IPO, by the end of the sample period, ﬁrms that underwent
their bond IPOs have higher returns on assets and lower earnings volatility than ﬁrms that
have not yet issued their ﬁrst bond in the public bond market.
19The Moody’s indexes track the performance of US dollar–denominated corporate debt issued in the U.S.
domestic bond market.
15Looking at the bottom panel of Table 1 we see that diﬀerences between the IPO ﬁrms
and non-IPO ﬁrms in the matched sample are less pronounced and are no longer signiﬁcant
for all the variables except those directly related to the ﬁrm size. This is encouraging in that
it suggests that our matching technique indeed limits the sample to similar ﬁrms and the
relationship between the bond IPO, and the loan spreads and analyst coverage we ﬁnd below
is likely to be causal.
Overall these results seem to suggest that ﬁrms which enter the public bond market
do so to ﬁnance growth, but as a result they become riskier at least in the short term. Their
proﬁtability increases in the long run, but not immediately after their bond IPO.
3 Do bond IPOs lower the cost of bank funding?
We investigate whether entering to the public bond market lowers the cost of bank funding by
comparing the interest rates on the loans that ﬁrms take out before and after their bond IPO.
We ﬁrst investigate the impact of bond IPOs on the cost of bank funding through a univariate
analysis and subsequently through a multivariate analysis. After that, we investigate whether
our results continue to hold when we employ the matched sample approach to account for the
bond IPO endogeneity.
3.1 Univariate analysis
To investigate whether ﬁrms are able to borrow at lower interest rates once they enter the
public bond market, we compare the interest rates on the loans they took out before entering
the public bond market with the interest rates on the loans they take out immediately after
their bond IPOs. We also compare the former interest rates with the average interest rate
on the loans ﬁrms take out after they enter the public bond market. Since, according to our
hypothesis, the eﬀect of the IPO will vary with the creditworthiness of the ﬁrm disclosed at
the time of the bond IPO, we compare the spreads on the loans the ﬁrms took before their
bond IPO with those they took after entering the public bond market for ﬁrms that entered
with an investment–grade bond separately from those that entered with a below–grade rated
bond.
The results of these interest rate comparisons, which are reported in Table 2, provide us
with two important insights. First, on average, after ﬁrms enter the public bond market they
are indeed able to borrow from banks at lower interest rates. Second, as we hypothesized, only
safe ﬁrms, that is, ﬁrms that enter the public bond market with a bond rated investment grade
beneﬁt from that reduction. For these ﬁrms, the bond IPO results in an immediate savings of
104 basis points on the spread over Libor of their bank loans. Importantly, these beneﬁts are
16not limited to the loans ﬁrms take out immediately after the bond IPO; they persist in time.
It remains to be seen whether these insights continue to hold when we account for all
of the variables that help explain loan spreads, and also whether or not they are derived from
diﬀerences across ﬁrms. It also remains to be seen what eﬀect, if any, the endogeneity of bond
IPO decision has on these insights. We investigate these issues next.
3.2 Multivariate analysis
Table 3 reports the ﬁrst set of multivariate tests we conduct to investigate the impact of the
bond IPO on the interest rates ﬁrms pay on their bank loans. Model 1 compares the interest
rates ﬁrms used to pay before their bond IPO with the interest rates they pay on the loans
they take out during the year after the IPO. Model 2 tests whether the impact of the bond
IPO on loan interest rates varies with the creditworthiness of the ﬁrm. Model 3, in turn, tests
whether the short–term eﬀect of the bond IPO on loan interest rates persists over time. Models
1 through 3 investigate these eﬀects controlling for our set of ﬁrm characteristics, F, and our
set of controls unrelated to ﬁrm and bond characteristics, O. Models 4 though 6 investigate
what happens when we expand these controls to account for our set of loan controls L.
The results reported in Table 3 show that the average ﬁrm is able to borrow from
banks at lower interest rates after its bond IPO, but the interest rate savings it gets are not
statistically diﬀerent from zero. This result arises because the eﬀect of bond IPOs on loan
interest rates depends critically on the creditworthiness of the ﬁrm. Firms that enter the
public bond market with a bond rated investment grade do beneﬁt from a reduction in the
interest rates they pay to borrow from banks. This reduction in loan spreads ranges from 22
to 35 basis points, depending on the model we consider, and is statistically signiﬁcant. These
savings start immediately after ﬁrms enter the public bond market and are more pronounced
then, as the coeﬃcient on our AFTER IGRADE IPO dummy variable is larger when we
limit our post bond IPO loans to those taken out by ﬁrms in the year following their entry to
the public bond market than when we look at all loans the ﬁrm takes through the end of the
sample period (compare models 2 and 5 with models 3 and 6, respectively). However, these
diﬀerences in coeﬃcients are not statistically signiﬁcant.
In contrast, ﬁrms that enter the public bond market with a bond rated below invest-
ment grade do not beneﬁt from a reduction on their loan interest rates. The coeﬃcient on
AFTER BGRADE IPO is always negative but is only statistically signiﬁcant when we con-
sider all of the loans these ﬁrms take out after the bond IPO and account for loan controls,
but even then it is signiﬁcant at only the 10% level.
With respect to the ﬁrm controls we use in our models, most of them do not have a
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on loan spreads, which was to be expected since we estimated
17our models with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. The controls that retain signiﬁcance, including returns on
assets, advertising and R&D expenses, ﬁxed assets and interest coverage, have the predicted
eﬀects on loan spreads.
All of the controls we consider that are not related to ﬁrm and loan characteristics
appear to aﬀect loan spreads. They indicate that ﬁrms beneﬁt from an interest rate discount
when they borrow from banks that they have a lending relationship with. They conﬁrm that
loan spreads are higher in recessions and when the bond yield curve is steeper. These controls
also show that there is a secular increase in loan spreads.
Finally, with respect to our loan controls, we ﬁnd that larger loans have lower spreads.
This could reﬂect economies of scale in loan size, but it may also reﬂect the fact that larger
ﬁrms, which tend to be safer, take larger loans. This is consistent with the decrease in the
coeﬃcient and the decline in signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient on ﬁrm assets when we account for
the size of the loan. Among the loan-purpose variables, our results show that corporate purpose
loans and working capital loans as well as loans to reﬁnance carry lower spreads. With respect
to loan types, credit lines have lower spreads than term loans, which in turn are not nearly
as risky as bridge loans. Most of the loan features that aim to increase loan safety (dividend
restrictions, secured interest and sponsors) generally have positive eﬀects on spreads. This is
consistent with the well-established result that banks tend to require these features for riskier
credits (see for example Berger and Udell (1990)). Last, loan maturity and whether the loan
is syndicated or not do not appear to have an eﬀect on the loan spread once we control for the
risk of the borrower and the remaining features of the loan.
In sum, the results of our multivariate analysis conﬁrm our earlier univariate ﬁndings:
after entering the public bond market ﬁrms, in particular those that enter the bond market
with a bond rated investment grade, are able to borrow from banks at lower interest rates.
3.2.1 Accounting for IPO endogeneity
Since bond IPOs are unlikely to be exogenous, this may raise some concerns with our previous
ﬁndings on the impact of bond IPOs on loan interest rates. To address these concerns we used
the matched sample techniques that have been developed in the literature. Speciﬁcally, we
estimate the probit model of the probability to issue the IPO bond in any given year, using as
explanatory variables a set of ﬁrm characteristics, described above, as follows:
Iit(IPO) = α + F0
it−1δ + ￿it,
where Iit(IPO) is an indicator of whether ﬁrm i issued an IPO bond in year t, F is a vector of
ﬁrm characteristicsdescribed above, and ￿it are i.i.d. gaussian standard errors. Using estimated
values of α and δ we can then construct the propensity score for each ﬁrm i in year t as a
18predicted probability of debt IPO. Next, using this propensity score, we use radius matching
to match IPO ﬁrms to those that have not yet issued a public bond. We do not force each IPO
ﬁrm to have a matching non-IPO ﬁrm, but rather we drop those bond IPO ﬁrms for which
there is no close match from the sample. We also drop non-IPO ﬁrms that were not found to
be closely matched to IPO ﬁrms. Our matched sample then consists of only the ﬁrms that are
similar in the probability of issuing a public bond. In such a sample, the coeﬃcient on our
IPO dummy variable can be reliably interpreted as a causal eﬀect of bond IPOs.
Table 4 reports the same tests as Table 3, but this time estimated on the matched
sample. Our results are qualitativelyvery similar to those found in the full sample and reported
in Table 3, partly because ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation ensures that the eﬀects we measure are
identiﬁed by the variation of loan spreads within each ﬁrm. There are some quantitative
diﬀerences: we ﬁnd that the decline in loan spreads after the investment grade bond IPO is
even larger in the matched sample than in the full sample, although it falls into the same
conﬁdence interval.20 As we would expect, the impact of our ﬁrm control variables on loan
spreads is no longer statistically signiﬁcant, because we constructed the matched sample based
on the similarity of a linear combination of these variables. Overall, we are assured that the
results we found in the full sample are not due to endogeneity of the IPO decision, but rather
represent a causal relationship.
The results we unveiled in this section regarding the eﬀect of bond IPOs on loan
interest rates are consistent with our hypothesis that banks price the informational advantage
they have vis-` a-vis their borrowers. That said, a natural question to ask is whether the decline
in loan spreads following the bond IPO is not driven instead by sample selection or by some
unobserved ﬁrm characteristics that change with bond IPO or simply by the bargaining power
that borrowers gain from their access to this alternative source of funding. In the next section
we present the results of some tests we perform to support our interpretation that the new
information on ﬁrms’ creditworthiness revealed at the time of the bond IPO is a contributing
factor for the decline in the interest rates that ﬁrms pay on the loans that they take out after
their bond IPO.
20The signiﬁcant increase in spreads after the non-rated IPO that we found in column (2) of Table 3 now
disappears, suggesting that it was probably driven by outliers, especially given the fact that this eﬀect was no
longer there once we controlled for loan characteristics.
194 Do bond IPOs reduce incumbent banks’ information advan-
tage?
We begin the investigation into this issue by looking more closely at our sample of bond IPO
ﬁrms in order to reduce concerns that sample selection may be driving our ﬁndings. As we can
see from the middle and lower panels of Table 1, while there are slight diﬀerences in the risk
measures for the ﬁrms that did and ﬁrms that did not undertake their bond IPO at the end
of our sample period when we consider full sample, these diﬀerences disappear in the matched
sample. Since our regression results are qualitatively similar in full and matched samples and
because we control for ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects and for credit risk measures in our regressions, we
believe the decline in loan spreads cannot be fully attributed to selection. Moreover, we do
not ﬁnd diﬀerences between non–IPO ﬁrms’ and IPO ﬁrms’ risk measures to be signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent for ﬁrms with investment grade as opposed to below grade bond IPO, which suggests
that ﬁrm selection is not a key driver of our ﬁndings. These ﬁndings nonetheless do not prove
that there was new information about ﬁrms’ creditworthiness revealed at the time of the bond
IPO and that this change in information drives the decline in loan spreads following bond IPO.
We have argued that bond IPOs lead to the release of new information on ﬁrms’
creditworthiness because of the information ﬁrms have to disclose in order to issue their bonds,
the scrutiny of both bond analysts and investors, and ﬁnally the role of rating agencies. The
literature on credit ratings shows that rating agencies produce valuable information about
ﬁrms.21 Credit ratings of IPO bonds are likely to be particularly informative because most
ﬁrms get their ﬁrst credit rating at the time of their bond IPO. Our investigation into this
issue shows that 86% of our bond IPO ﬁrms did not have a credit rating two years prior to
their bond IPO, and 81% of them were still without a credit rating in the year prior to their
bond IPO. Thus, as we postulated, the vast majority of ﬁrms get their ﬁrst credit rating only
at the time when they issue their ﬁrst bond in the public bond market. This rating is likely
to contain valuable information about the ﬁrm’s creditworthiness.
We take advantage of the existence of some ﬁrms with a credit rating prior to their bond
IPO to investigate whether the information about ﬁrms’ creditworthiness made public at the
time of the bond IPO through credit ratings is a driver of our ﬁndings on loan interest rates.
As we argued in the methodology section, if the decline in incumbent banks’ informational
rents is a contributing factor for our loan interest rate ﬁndings, then we would expect that,
among ﬁrms that enter the bond market with an investment grade bond, ﬁrms that were not
rated previously would experience a larger impact on the loan interest rates than ﬁrms that
21See Liu and Thakor (1984), Ederington, Yawitz, and Roberts (1987), and Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich
(1992) for evidence that rating agencies produce valuable information on ﬁrms.
20already had an investment grade rating at that time. The reasons are that the IPO rating
is more informative for the former ﬁrms than the latter ones and that an indication that the
ﬁrm is safe would increase competition to extend loans to the ﬁrm from uninformed banks. In
contrast, since uninformed banks will likely reduce their competition to extend loans to ﬁrms
that become known to be risky, we would expect that, among the ﬁrms that enter the bond
market with a speculative grade bond, ﬁrms that did not have a credit rating before would
experience less of a decline in loan spreads than ﬁrms that already had a speculative rating at
the time.22
To test this hypothesis we consider a speciﬁcation similar to that in column (2) of
Tables 3 and 4, which accounts for whether the IPO bond was rated investment grade or below
grade. We expand this speciﬁcation to include the interaction terms for the dummy variable
which indicates whether the ﬁrm had a credit rating before its bond IPO and our set of dummy
variables that account for the rating of the ﬁrm’s IPO bond. The results of this regression for
the full sample are reported in columns (1)-(3) of Table 5. Columns (4)-(6) of that table report
the results for the matched sample. As before, we continue to control for ﬁrm characteristics
as well as other factors that may explain loan spreads, and include ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects and the
trend to account for any initial conditions of the ﬁrms and any time variation common to all
ﬁrms.
We start by identifying all ﬁrms that were already rated two years before their bond
IPO, regardless of the rating they had at the time of their bond IPO.23 According to the results
of these models, reported in columns (1) and (4) of Table 5, ﬁrms that were not rated before
their bond IPO experienced about 44 basis points decline in their loan spread after the IPO if
they entered the bond market with an investment grade bond and a decline of about 24 basis
points in their loan spread after the IPO if they entered the market with a speculative grade
bond (although that latter coeﬃcient is only signiﬁcant at a 10% level). To see whether the
eﬀect of bond IPO was diﬀerent for ﬁrms with prior ratings, we look at the interaction terms.
According to our results, ﬁrms that were rated prior to their bond IPO and entered the bond
market with an investment grade bond experienced a smaller decline in their loan spreads
afterwards, as we conjectured. We do not ﬁnd, however, that rated ﬁrms that entered the
bond market with a bond rated below investment grade experienced a larger decline in spreads
22In fact, if information about creditworthiness was the only eﬀect of the bond IPO, we would actually expect
spreads on bank loans to increase for ﬁrms that were not previously rated but entered the bond market with a
bond rated below investment grade.
23While there is not much diﬀerence between the ratings two years prior to bond IPO and only on year prior
to bond IPO, we chose to report the results with ratings ﬁrms had two years prior to bond IPO to avoid any
eﬀects on ratings the preparation of the bond IPO might have.
21than unrated ﬁrms that also entered the market with a bond rated below investment grade.
Recall that for the unrated ﬁrms entering with a below grade bond the release of information
on their creditworthiness may be detrimental since it may reduce the competition from those
banks that were previously uninformed about their creditworthiness.
The previous speciﬁcation accounts for the ﬁrms that were already rated at the time
of their bond IPO, but it does not account for the eﬀect of the ratings of these ﬁrms on
loan spreads. Since ﬁrm ratings have a direct eﬀect on loan spreads, we proceed with our
investigation by distinguishing whether ﬁrms were rated investment grade or below grade
before their bond IPO. We further identify ﬁrms that were rated investment grade and entered
the bond market with a bond rated investment grade, and those ﬁrms that were rated below
investment grade and entered that market with a bond rated below investment grade. We
included all the other rated ﬁrms that did not have similar matchings in a separate category.
The results of this investigation are reported in columns (2) and (5) of Table 5. The
new results are consistent with our earlier ﬁndings. This was expected because most ﬁrms
that were rated before their bond IPO received a rating within the same IGRADE and
BGRADE categories in their IPO bond, i.e. there are not many observations that fall un-
der the SWITCH IGRADE/BGRADE category. Thus, we continue to ﬁnd that ﬁrms that
were rated investment grade and entered the bond market with a bond also rated investment
grade beneﬁt from a smaller decline in their loan spreads than unrated ﬁrms that entered
the bond market with a bond rated investment grade. We still do not ﬁnd that rated ﬁrms
that entered the bond market with a bond rated below investment grade experienced a larger
decline in spreads than unrated ﬁrms that also entered the market with a bond rated below
investment grade.
While restricting our analysis to broad rating categories makes the ﬁrms we compare
more similar, except for their rating status prior to the bond IPO, this approach still leaves
opportunities for important diﬀerences across ﬁrms within the two groups. For instance, there
may be important diﬀerences in the rating composition within the investment grade and below
grade categories of IPO bonds of previously rated and unrated ﬁrms. Indeed, ﬁrms in our
sample of unrated ﬁrms that enters the market with an investment grade IPO bond are riskier,
in the sense that this sample has a higher portion of the lower rated bonds in that category,
than our sample of rated ﬁrms that enters the bond market with an investment grade bond.
The same is true for the sub-samples of ﬁrms that enter the bond market with a bond rated
below investment grade. In addition, there may also be diﬀerences in the rating of the ﬁrm and
the rating of its IPO bond even when we restrict the analysis to cases in which both ratings
belong to same category (IGRADE or BGRADE). Indeed, when we consider whole ratings, we
ﬁnd that 21% of the ﬁrms that were rated investment grade and 32% of the ﬁrms that were
22rated below investment grade prior to their bond IPO entered the bond market with a bond
that had a rating diﬀerent from the ﬁrm’s rating.
To alleviate concerns with these diﬀerences and attempt to identify the “pure” in-
formation eﬀect of the rating announced at the time of the bond IPO, we further limit our
comparison between the unrated ﬁrms and the rated ﬁrms by selecting ﬁrms that have the
same whole rating and not just the same rating category (IGRADE or BGRADE) for their
ﬁrm rating and for their bond IPO. More speciﬁcally, for the investment grade rated ﬁrms
we identify the most common rating (BBB), separate all the ﬁrms that enter the bond mar-
ket with a BBB-rated bond from ﬁrms with other investment grade rated bonds, and then
interact our new AFTER BBB IPO and AFTER NON − BBB IGRADE IPO indicators
with BBB RATED and OTHER IGRATED indicators, respectively. We were not able to
perform a similar reﬁning of our earlier test for the ﬁrms that were rated below investment
grade because only a small number of such ﬁrms entered the bond market with a bond having
the same rating as the ﬁrm rating and none of these ﬁrms took out loans within one after the
bond IPO.24
The results of this test are reported in columns (3) and (6) of Table 5. We continue
to ﬁnd that ﬁrms that had credit ratings before their bond IPO do not experience as large a
decline in loan spreads after their bond IPO as do the unrated ﬁrms. In particular, among the
ﬁrms that entered the public bond market with a BBB-rated bond, those that did not have a
rating before experienced a 50 basis points decline in the loan spreads, while those that already
had a BBB rating experienced the decline of only 16 basis points. This ﬁnding is consistent
with our hypothesis that the information revealed on ﬁrms’ creditworthiness at the time of the
bond IPO is likely to reduce loan spreads.
As we noted above, we do not ﬁnd supporting evidence for our hypothesis on the
role of this information in the case of risky ﬁrms. It is unclear, though, whether this lack of
supporting evidence among risky ﬁrms arises because the result is not in the data or because
data limitations prevent us from using our stricter test to identify the eﬀect of the information
on ﬁrms’ creditworthiness released at the time of the bond IPO for these ﬁrms. It is worth
noting that even if there were no data limitations, our latest test would still be less informative
for these risky ﬁrms since the ﬁrm ratings appear to have a lower predictive power of the bond
IPO ratings for these ﬁrms than for safe ﬁrms. Note that, as we indicated above, while 79% of
the ﬁrms rated investment grade enter the bond market with an IPO that has the same rating
as the ﬁrm, only 68% of the ﬁrms rated below investment grade enter the bond market with a
bond that has the same rating as the ﬁrms, looking at whole rating categories.
In sum, the decline in loan spreads after the bond IPO, especially for those ﬁrms that
24To be more precise, we do not have loan spreads within one year of the bond IPO for any of these ﬁrms.
23enter the public bond market with a bond rated investment grade, appears to be consistent
with our hypothesis that the release of new information about the ﬁrm’s creditworthiness at
the time of its bond IPO reduces the informational rents of incumbent banks.
5 Are bond IPOs costly to ﬁrms?
As we noted above, our ﬁnding that safer ﬁrms are able to beneﬁt from a reduction in the loan
interest rates after they enter the public bond market raises an important question: why is it
that many of these ﬁrms never issue a public bond? A possible explanation for this puzzle is
that public bond ﬁnancing is only economically viable when the ﬁrm has largeneeds for external
funding. Blackwell and Kidwell (1988), and Krishnaswami, Spindt, and Subramaniam (1999)
for example, argue that the ﬂotation costs of public placements make public bond ﬁnancing
unattractive for ﬁrms with small needs for external funding. Another possible explanation for
this puzzle is that it is costly for ﬁrms, even the safer ﬁrms, to enter the public bond market.
We investigate this hypothesis next. We begin by investigating whether underwriting costs are
higher for IPO bonds. After that, we investigate whether underpricing in the bond market,
which is another source of the costs ﬁrms incur to enter the public bond market, is also higher
for IPO bonds. In both instances we investigate if these costs aﬀect all ﬁrms, including those
that enter the bond market with a bond rated investment grade.
5.1 Do ﬁrms pay higher underwriting costs on their IPO bonds?
We attempt to answer this question by comparing the gross spreads ﬁrms pay on their IPO
bonds with the gross spreads they pay on their subsequent bonds. For reasons which we will
explain below we also compare the ex ante credit spreads of IPO bonds with the ex ante credit
spreads on the bonds that ﬁrms issue subsequently.
5.1.1 Do IPO bonds carry higher gross spreads?
Table 6 reports the results of our investigation on the gross spreads of bonds issued by our
bond IPO ﬁrms. Recall that we want to ascertain if gross spreads, which are a measure of
the costs of bond underwriting, are higher for IPO bonds than for the subsequent bonds these
ﬁrms issue as this shows that ﬁrms incur a cost to ﬁrst enter the public bond market. We
attempt to identify this eﬀect by controlling ﬁrst for the set of ﬁrm characteristics F, and the
set of controls unrelated to ﬁrm and bond characteristics, O, (models 1 through 3). We then
expand these controls to account for the bond features, B, that are likely to play a role in
underwriting costs, (models 4 through 6). As we explained above, we choose to introduce the
latter controls separately because they may be determined jointly with gross spreads.
24Model 1 investigates whether IPO bonds carry higher gross spreads by including the
IPO dummy variable in our model of bond gross spreads. According to this model, everything
else equal, ﬁrms pay on average 19 more basis points on the gross spread of their IPO bonds
than on the public bonds they issue afterwards. Model 2, which adds the dummy variable
SECOND to our previous model of gross spreads to investigate whether such costs persist
beyond the IPO, conﬁrms that underwriting costs are higher for IPO bonds. According to
this model, the second public bond the ﬁrm issues also carries higher gross spreads than its
subsequent bond issues, but not by as much as its IPO bond. On average, the diﬀerence in the
gross spreads between the IPO bond and the second bond the ﬁrm issues in the public bond
market is 11 basis points, which is statistically signiﬁcant at all of the usual conﬁdence levels.
Model 3 investigates whether the underwriting costs of entering the public bond market
as measured by the gross spreads of bonds vary with the creditworthiness of ﬁrm. To this end,
we add to model 2 the IGRADE dummy variable, which takes the value 1 for bonds rated
investment grade, and the interaction of this variable with our IPO variable. The results of
this model show that the premium in the gross spreads that ﬁrms pay on their IPO bonds does
not vary signiﬁcantly with the credit rating of the IPO bond. Even though the coeﬃcient on
the interaction of our IPO dummy variable with the IGRADE dummy variable is negative,
it is not statistically signiﬁcant. Indeed, we can conﬁrm by an F-test, shown at the bottom of
the table, that the ﬁrms that enter the public bond market with an investment grade bond,
pay higher gross spreads on their IPO bonds than on the bonds that they issue afterwards. In
other words, these ﬁrms also pay a premium on the gross spreads they pay underwriters when
they issue their ﬁrst public bond.
Comparing models 1 through 3 with models 4 through 6, which add to the previous
models the size of the bond issue and its maturity, we see that the inclusion of these controls
does not change the thrust of our earlier ﬁndings. The new models continue to show that it is
costly to enter the public bond market because IPO bonds carry higher gross spreads than the
bonds ﬁrms issue subsequently, and this cost aﬀects all ﬁrms irrespective of their credit rating.
Furthermore, we continue to ﬁnd that even those ﬁrms that enter the public bond market with
bonds rated investment grade pay a premium on the gross spread of their IPO bonds.
Regarding the coeﬃcients of the control variables that we use in these models, they
are generally consistent with the discussion given in the methodology subsection and with the
ﬁndings of the earlier literature, so we skip their analysis in the interest of space.25
In sum, our results show that IPO bonds carry higher gross spreads than the subsequent
25The bank relationship dummy variable drops out because our models are estimated with ﬁxed eﬀects and
this variable does not vary over time. Recall that this dummy variable is equal to 1 if the ﬁrm issued a public
bond to or took a syndicated loan from a bank that participated in the underwriting syndicate of its bond IPO.
25bonds that these ﬁrms issue. Our results also show that ﬁrms continue to pay a gross spread
premium on the second bond they issue in the public bond market, but this premium is not
as large as that they pay on their IPO bonds. Finally, our results show that ﬁrms entering
the public bond market with an investment grade rated bond pay a lower “entry” premium
than those that do so with a below grade rated bond, but the diﬀerence between the two is
not statistically signiﬁcant.
5.1.2 Do IPO bonds carry higher ex ante credit spreads?
We interpreted in the previous subsection the gross spread premium ﬁrms pay the underwriters
of their IPO bonds as evidence that it is costly to ﬁrst enter the public bond market. It is
possible, however, that underwriters compensate ﬁrms for this extra cost by guaranteeing them
a higher price on their IPO bonds than the price they guarantee ﬁrms on their subsequent
issues. We do not have information on the price that underwriters guarantee ﬁrms. However,
by looking at the ex ante yield spreads on IPO bonds, and indirectly on the oﬀer prices of
these bonds, we can ascertain whether there is such a substitution eﬀect.
To this end, we next investigate the ex ante credit spreads (over Treasuries with the
same maturities) of IPO bonds. The results of this investigation are reported in Table 7. As
in our investigation of bond gross spreads, and for the same reasons, the ﬁrst set of regressions
in the table controls for the ﬁrm characteristics F and our set of controls unrelated to ﬁrm
and bond characteristics O. The second set of regressions adds to these regressions our set of
bond controls B.
According to model 1, on average, the ex ante credit spreads of IPO bonds are 52 basis
points higher than the credit spreads of the bonds subsequently issued by these ﬁrms. As we
can see from model 2, this premium is limited to the IPO bond. Note that the coeﬃcient on the
dummy variable for the second bond the ﬁrm issues in the public bond market, SECOND, is
not statistically signiﬁcant. Further, according to model 3, the credit spread premium applies
only to risky ﬁrms. Importantly, ﬁrms that enter the public bond market with a bond rated
investment grade do not get a discount on the yield they pay on their IPO bonds. According
to model 3, the coeﬃcient on the interaction of the IPO bond dummy variable with the
investment grade dummy variable is negative but not statistically signiﬁcant. However, since
the coeﬃcients on IPO and IPOxIGRADE are not independent, we can obtain additional
information from testing the joint hypothesis that for the investment grade bonds, the eﬀect
of the IPO is zero. The F-test, presented in the bottom of Table 7 conﬁrms that we cannot
reject the hypothesis that ﬁrms entering the public bond market with a bond rated investment
grade pay the same ex ante credit spread on their IPO bonds as on their subsequent bonds.
Comparing models 1 through 3 with models 4 through 6, which add to the previous
26models our set of bond–speciﬁc controls, we see that while the magnitude of the IPO eﬀects is
now smaller, adding these controls does not change the thrust of the key ﬁndings we identify
based on the former models.
The coeﬃcients on the ﬁrm control variables we use in these models are generally
insigniﬁcant, which was to be expected given that models are estimated with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects.
With respect to the bond–related controls and our controls for the economy and the state of
the bond market, they show results that are consistent with our discussion in the methodology
section, and so we skip their discussion in the interest of space.
In conclusion, according to our ﬁndings, IPO bonds carry higher ex ante credit spreads
than the bonds ﬁrms issue subsequently in the public bond market. Our results also show that
this yield premium is limited to IPO bonds; it is not present for the second bond that ﬁrms
issue in the public bond market. Further, our results show that the yield premium is larger for
IPO bonds rated below investment grade than for investment grade IPO bonds. These results
are very similar to our ﬁndings in the previous subsection on gross spreads. This parallelism is
important because it disproves the possibility that higher gross spreads on IPO bonds do not
translate into higher costs to ﬁrms because underwriters compensate issuers by oﬀering them
higher guaranteed prices on their IPO bonds. While safer ﬁrms pay a premium on the gross
spreads of their IPO bonds they do not appear to be charged a premium on ex-ante credit
spreads of these bonds. In contrast, riskier ﬁrms pay a premium on both of these spreads on
their IPO bonds. The results of these two subsections, therefore, show that the additional
compensation ﬁrms have to pay underwriters to issue their IPO bonds alone makes it costly
to them to ﬁrst enter the public bond market. They also show that while this cost aﬀects
predominantly ﬁrms rated below investment grade, it also aﬀects investment grade ﬁrms.
5.2 Do IPO bonds suﬀer from more underpricing in the secondary market?
The costs of entering the public bond market may not be limitedto the additional compensation
ﬁrms have to pay bond underwriters. As with the decision to ﬂoat the equity, entering the
public bond market may also be costly because of the underpricing ﬁrms have to oﬀer in order
to attract demand for their IPO bonds. To investigate whether IPO bonds suﬀer from more
underpricing in the bond market than public bonds of seasoned issuers, we estimate our model
of the diﬀerence between the spreads in the primary market and the spreads in the secondary
market when IPO bonds ﬁrst trade. We compute these spreads over the Moody’s index of bond
yields with the same rating of the bond on the issuance day and ﬁrst trading day, respectively.
We consider in this test only bonds whose ﬁrst trade is within one month of the issue date and
for which we have all the necessary data to compute the bond’s yield at that time.
These requirements, in conjunction with the low trading frequency of bonds and the
27fact that our data source on market prices goes back only to 1995, leaves us with a much
smaller sample of bonds (63 IPO bonds and 296 non-IPO bonds). For this reason, in this
section we investigate whether IPO bonds suﬀer from more underpricing based on pooled
regressions alone. Therefore, unlike in our previous analysis, these results are most likely
driven by diﬀerences between ﬁrms rather than diﬀerences between bond issues of the same
ﬁrm. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd the results presented below informative in that they show the
diﬀerence in underpricing on IPO vs. subsequent bonds. Moreover, we control for a number
of ﬁrm characteristics, to minimize their inﬂuence on our results.
The results of our model on market underpricing are reported in Table 8. We follow
the same approach adopted in the previous subsections, that is, we ﬁrst investigate if market
underpricing is higher for IPO bonds than for seasoned bonds controlling for the set of ﬁrm
characteristics, F, and the set of additional controls that is unrelated to bond characteristics,
O (models 1 through 3). The second set of regressions in the table (models 4 through 6) adds
to these controls our set of bond controls, B.
As the results of model (1) of Table 8 show, IPO bonds suﬀer from more market un-
derpricing than seasoned public issues but the diﬀerence between them is not statistically
signiﬁcant.26 Model 2 shows, however, that when we account separately for the pricing of the
second bond that ﬁrms issue in the public bond market, we ﬁnd evidence of IPO underpricing,
as the coeﬃcient on our IPO dummy variable becomes positive and statistically signiﬁcant.
Given that the coeﬃcient on our second bond dummy, SECOND, is not statistically signiﬁ-
cant, the results of model 2 indicate that underpricing is highest for IPO bonds and starts to
decline with the next bond that ﬁrms issue after they enter the public bond market.
Model 3 investigates whether the underpricing of IPO bonds varies with the bond’s
credit rating. According to the results of this model, ﬁrms that enter the public bond market
with a bond rated investment grade suﬀer from less underpricing than those that do it with
a bond rated below grade, but the diﬀerence in underpricing between these bonds is not
statistically signiﬁcant. Again, we rely on the F-test to determine whether the diﬀerence
between ex ante and market yields is statisticallysigniﬁcant for ﬁrms that enter the market with
investment grade bonds. As with the ex ante spreads above, we cannot reject the hypothesis
that ﬁrms entering the public bond market with an investment grade bond experience no
underpricing with respect to secondary markets.
These ﬁndings continue to hold when we control for bond characteristics (models 4
though 6). Note that adding these controls increases the statistical signiﬁcance of our IPO
26This result diﬀers from Cai, Helwege and Warga (2005) in that they ﬁnd that underpricing is statistically
signiﬁcantly higher for IPO bonds than for non-IPOs, a diﬀerence which may be attributable to the larger share
of speculative grade bonds that they have in their sample of IPO bonds (more on this diﬀerence below).
28dummy variable, therefore conﬁrming our initial ﬁnding that IPO bonds suﬀer more from
underpricing in the bond market than public bonds of seasoned issuers.
With respect to the controls we consider in the multivariate analysis, most of them
are not statistically signiﬁcant, which was to be expected given the nature of our dependent
variable. Those that are signiﬁcant show that underpricing increases with the maturity of the
bond and the slope of the bond yield curve (as determined by the diﬀerence between the spread
of the triple-B rated bonds and that of triple-A rated bonds). These eﬀects are likely due to
the fact that the Moody’s yield indexes we use to compute bond spreads in the primary and
secondary markets do not perfectly match the credit rating and maturity of the bonds in our
sample.27 Our results also show that underpricing is higher for bonds with a sinking fund and
bonds underwritten by banks with a smaller share of the market. The sinking fund eﬀect is
also likely due to the fact that our dummy variable for the existence of a sinking fund does not
capture all the diﬀerent aspects that characterize these funds. Since the market share tends to
correlate with the reputation of the underwriter, that result suggests that IPO bonds brought
to the market by underwriters with better reputations suﬀer from less underpricing.
As a ﬁnal note, when we allow for the small subset of ﬁrms that had ratings prior to
their bond IPO to have diﬀerent degree of underpricing,28 to parallel our study of loan spreads,
we ﬁnd that ﬁrms that had an investment grade rating two years before their bond IPO do
not experience any underpricing in terms of ex–ante or gross spreads, while ﬁrms that had
a below grade rating before their bond IPO experience even higher underpricing on ex–ante
spreads and the same degree of underpricing in terms of gross spreads compared to the ﬁrms
that did not have a rating before. We did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in underpricing in
terms of secondary market spreads between ﬁrms that did and that did not have rating before
their bond IPO.
Summing up, the results we unveiled in this section portray a very clear picture of the
costs ﬁrms have to incur to ﬁrst enter the public bond market. These costs arise from both the
extra compensation they have to pay underwriters of their IPO bonds and from the additional
underpricing their IPO bonds face in the secondary bond market. Another robust result of our
analysis is that these costs are higher for ﬁrms that enter this market with a bond rated below
investment grade. Firms that enter the market with an investment grade bond, though, also
incur these costs. This is particularly evident in the gross spreads they pay to issue their IPO
bond. Thus, while the latter ﬁrms beneﬁt from a reduction in the informational rents they
27Moody’s has individual yield indexes only for whole credit ratings. In addition, Moody’s individual yield
indexes are not broken down by bond maturity.
28The results of these additional tests are not reported in the interests of space but are available from authors
upon request.
29pay banks after they enter the public bond market, they also incur some costs to ﬁrst access
this market. These costs are a contributing factor in reducing the number of ﬁrms that rely
on bond ﬁnancing despite our evidence on the beneﬁts of accessing the bond market and the
other beneﬁts that researchers have identiﬁed with ﬁrms’ access to bond funding.
6 Final remarks
In this paper, we compare bank loan spreads for borrowers before and after they gain access to
the public bond market. We ﬁnd that these spreads decline, particularly for safer ﬁrms, after
ﬁrms issue for the ﬁrst time in the public bond market. Our results are both economically and
statistically signiﬁcant, and they continue to hold when we control for ﬁrm- and loan-speciﬁc
factors and for the endogeneity of ﬁrms that undertake their bond IPOs.
Our ﬁndings are consistent with a model in which banks earn informational rents, such
as Rajan (1992): Informational rents should decline when new information identifying the
ﬁrms’ creditworthiness is made public, increasing outside banks’ willingness to bid on loans to
these ﬁrms, particularly the safer ﬁrms. Our investigation of the diﬀerence between the impact
of bond IPOs experienced by the ﬁrms that had a credit rating prior to the bond IPO and the
ﬁrms that were not rated produces results consistent with our hypothesis that new information
about the ﬁrm is made public at that time, thereby, reducing the informational advantage of
incumbent banks. Finally, our ﬁndings that it is costly to ﬁrst issue in the public bond market,
even for ﬁrms that enter with a bond rated investment grade, provides a potential explanation
of why not all safe ﬁrms opt for entering the public bond market.
Our work opens up several avenues for additional research. As we have noted, our
sample focuses on relatively large, often syndicated loans taken out by publicly listed ﬁrms.
Since information problems are typically thought to be greater for smaller, privately held ﬁrms,
investigatingthe behavior of loan spreads for such ﬁrms when they ﬁrst gain access to the public
bond market might aﬀord greater insight into the size of any informational rents that banks
earn. Even though we rely on publicly listed ﬁrms, we still ﬁnd that new information on a
ﬁrm is revealed when it issues its ﬁrst public bond. Since this informational eﬀect of the bond
IPO is likely to be larger for privately held ﬁrms or in connection with the ﬁrm equity IPO,
particularly for ﬁrms that have not accessed the public bond market, an investigation of which
market ﬁrms choose to enter ﬁrst also appears to be a fruitful area for future research.
30Table 1. Sample characterization
a
Firm changes resulting from the bond IPO
Variables 1 year before 1 year after Diﬀerence T-stat
debt IPO debt IPO
L ASSETS 5.72 6.26 0.54*** 6.06
L SALES 5.53 5.90 0.37*** 3.60
ROA 0.022 0.011 -0.011 1.56
EARNINGS VOL 0.031 0.032 0.001 0.12
LEVERAGE 0.37 0.47 0.10*** 6.14
TANGIBLES 0.61 0.63 0.02** 1.99
ADVERTISING+R&D 0.15 0.019 -0.13 1.02
INVESTMENTS 0.10 0.098 0.002 0.43
INTEREST COV 29.8 1.4 -28.4** -2.06
Firms that issued a debt IPO vs. ﬁrms that did not issue a debt IPO
b
Debt IPO ﬁrms Non IPO ﬁrms Diﬀerence T-stat
L ASSETS 7.97 5.27 2.70*** 34.1
L SALES 7.70 5.28 2.42*** 31.1
ROA 0.012 -0.034 0.046*** 5.49
EARNINGS VOL 0.039 0.079 -0.040** 2.10
LEVERAGE 0.37 0.31 0.06*** 3.65
TANGIBLES 0.68 0.51 0.17*** 17.8
ADVERTISING+R&D 0.09 0.51 -0.42* 1.89
INVESTMENTS 0.050 0.049 0.001 0.08
INTEREST COV 11.0 15.3 -4.3 0.46
Firms that issued a debt IPO vs ﬁrms that did not issue a debt IPO: matched sample
c
Debt IPO ﬁrms Non IPO ﬁrms Diﬀerence T-stat
L ASSETS 7.38 6.25 1.12*** 10.5
L SALES 7.04 6.28 0.76*** 6.68
ROA -0.029 -0.017 -0.012 0.66
EARNINGS VOL 0.027 0.029 -0.001 0.32
LEVERAGE 0.39 0.38 0.0086 0.44
TANGIBLES 0.68 0.61 0.075** 2.15
ADVERTISING+R&D 0.085 0.099 -0.014 0.16
INVESTMENTS 0.69 0.69 -0.001 0.060
INTEREST COV 19.8 6.02 13.7 1.05
a L ASSETS Log of real assets in millions of 1980 dollars computed with the CPI deﬂator; L SALES real
sales in millions of 1980 dollars computed with the CPI deﬂator; ROA returns on assets (net income divided
by assets); EARNINGS V OL earnings volatility (the standard deviation of the ﬁrm’s quarterly return on
assets over the last three years); LEV ERAGE leverage ratio (debt over total assets); TANGIBLES tangible
assets (inventories plus plant, property, and equipment over total assets); ADV ERTISING + R&D expenses
with advertising and R&D scaled by the ﬁrm’s sales; INV ESTMENTS investments scaled by its assets;
INTEREST COV the interest coverage (EBITDA divided by interest expense).
b Comparison performed at the end of our sample period (2002).
c Comparison performed at the end of our sample period (2002) with only ﬁrms from the matched sample
included.
Source: Authors’ computations.
31Table 2. Impact of the bond IPO on loan spreads: Univariate analysis
a
Avg. spread before vs Avg. sprd within 1 year Avg. spread before vs Avg. sprd after
Avg. before Avg. 1 year Diﬀ Avg. before Avg. after Diﬀ
(Obs) (Obs) (T-stat) (Obs) (Obs) (T-Stat)
All IPOs 194.2 177.5 -16.7*** 194.2 167.0 -27.2***
(12835) (951) (4.60) (12835) (2293) (11.1)
IGrade IPOs 194.2 90.3 -103.9*** 194.2 85.3 -108.8***
(12835) (223) (18.2) (12835) (589) (28.6)
BGrade IPOs 194.2 206.5 12.3*** 194.2 206.2 12.1***
(12835) (577) (3.11) (12835) (1130) (4.20)
a Loan spread is the all-in-drawn spread over Libor at origination. IGRADE IPOS IPO bonds rated investment
grade by Moody’s. BGRADE IPOS IPO bonds rated below grade by Moody’s.
Source: Authors’ computations.
32Table 3. Impact of the bond IPO on loan spreads: Multivariate analysis.
a
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AFTER IPO -9.77 -12.35
(9.98) (8.88)
AFTER IGRADE IPO -35.39*** -26.20*** -33.02*** -22.28**
(10.43) (10.02) (10.91) (10.28)
AFTER BGRADE IPO -18.04 -18.28 -17.99 -18.30*
(13.96) (12.14) (12.01) (10.82)
AFTRE NR IPO 43.79** 20.73 26.04 10.22
(17.60) (15.39) (19.46) (15.32)
L AGE 14.32 14.23 16.19* 10.92 10.94 15.52*
(9.46) (9.49) (9.00) (9.05) (9.09) (8.57)
L ASSETS -7.49* -7.49* -7.30** -3.64 -3.72 -4.18
(4.08) (4.06) (3.70) (4.05) (4.05) (3.64)
ROA -61.89*** -63.08*** -57.10*** -47.11** -48.12** -42.59**
(22.80) (22.75) (21.28) (21.64) (21.65) (20.27)
EARNINGS VOL 2.36 2.35 2.33 2.19 2.19 2.23
(2.42) (2.42) (2.44) (2.77) (2.76) (2.79)
LEVERAGE 12.01 12.65 12.62 22.61* 23.04* 24.56**
(13.74) (13.73) (12.96) (12.94) (12.95) (12.35)
TANGIBLES -20.78** -19.19* -23.13** -15.93* -14.76 -19.83**
(10.11) (9.95) (9.52) (9.52) (9.45) (9.21)
INVESTMENTS 2.79 2.65 4.75 -2.00 -2.06 0.30
(15.77) (15.94) (15.11) (14.78) (14.85) (14.16)
ADVERTISING+R&D -1.06*** -1.06*** -1.04*** -0.55*** -0.55*** -0.61***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13)
INTEREST COV -5.79** -5.70** -7.25*** -6.31*** -6.23*** -7.91***
(2.35) (2.34) (2.25) (2.21) (2.21) (2.20)
TREND 5.75*** 5.78*** 5.18*** 5.65*** 5.69*** 4.55***
(1.32) (1.32) (1.30) (1.27) (1.27) (1.22)
RECESSION 20.74*** 20.87*** 18.83*** 20.38*** 20.45*** 19.13***
(4.73) (4.75) (4.34) (4.57) (4.57) (4.16)
BBB—AAA SPREAD -40.06*** -40.06*** -40.14*** -29.31*** -29.48*** -29.25***
(6.97) (6.91) (6.30) (6.64) (6.62) (6.13)
LRELATIONSHIP -5.24** -5.51** -7.30*** -4.77* -4.97** -5.78**
(2.57) (2.58) (2.45) (2.47) (2.48) (2.43)
L AMOUNT -4.07* -3.94* -4.35*
(2.33) (2.31) (2.26)
L MATURITY 0.29 0.15 -0.03
(2.11) (2.10) (1.94)
SECURED 25.73*** 25.51*** 25.42***
(5.50) (5.48) (5.35)
SENIOR -13.39** -13.36** -8.91
(6.65) (6.63) (6.02)
CORPORATE PURP -10.13** -9.99** -9.30**
(4.92) (4.90) (4.54)
Continues on the next page.
33Table 3 (Continued).
a
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
REFINANCE -14.81*** -15.14*** -15.00***
(4.40) (4.39) (4.15)
TAKEOVER 9.97* 9.37* 11.01**
(5.46) (5.45) (5.12)
WORKING CAPITAL -14.62*** -14.85*** -11.46**
(5.13) (5.12) (5.03)
TERM LOAN 16.07*** 15.88*** 14.93***
(4.17) (4.15) (4.01)
CREDIT LINE -11.93*** -11.92*** -12.93***
(4.16) (4.14) (3.99)
BRIDGE LOAN 54.67*** 52.99*** 48.62***
(14.33) (14.27) (13.35)
GUARANTOR 5.50 4.18 2.01
(6.84) (6.97) (6.67)
SPONSOR 48.17*** 48.03*** 45.02***
(8.53) (8.70) (8.38)
RENEWAL -1.75 -1.59 3.41
(8.74) (8.78) (8.58)
DIVIDEND REST 3.24 3.16 6.07*
(3.40) (3.41) (3.30)
SYNDICATED -4.39 -4.75 -2.28
(4.59) (4.57) (4.57)
Constant 68.79*** 67.91*** 72.97*** 151.04*** 149.01*** 151.38***
(20.10) (20.32) (18.08) (33.44) (33.58) (32.03)
Observations 8499 8499 9564 7950 7950 8942
R
2 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.79 0.80 0.79
a Dependent variable is LOAN SPREAD, the loan spread at origination over Libor; AFTER IPO is a dummy
variable that takes the value 1 for the loans taken out after the ﬁrm’s bond IPO; AFTER IGRADE IPO is
a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the loans taken out after the ﬁrm’s bond IPO that are rated
investment grade; AFTER BGRADE IPO is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the loans taken out
after the ﬁrm’s bond IPO that are rated below grade; AFTER NR IPO is a dummy variable that takes the
value 1 for the loans taken out after the ﬁrm’s bond IPO for which the rating on the ﬁrst public bond the ﬁrm
issues is missing. See deﬁnitions of ﬁrm controls in Table 1. RECESSION is a dummy variable which takes
the value 1 if the bond was issued during a recession; BBB − AAA SPREAD is the diﬀerence between the
Moody’s indexes on the yields of triple-A and triple-B rated bonds; LRELATIONSHIP is a dummy variable
which takes the value 1 if the ﬁrm borrowed from the lead underwriter(s) in the loan syndicate at least once in
the year prior to the loan; L AMOUNT is the log of loan amount in 1980 dollars; L MATURITY is the log of
loan maturity in years; SECURED is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the loan is secured; SENIOR
is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the loan is senior; CORPORATE PURP is a dummy variable
that takes the value 1 if the loan is for corporate purposes; REFINANCE is a dummy variable that takes the
value 1 if the loan is to repay existing debt; TAKEOV ER is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the loan
is to ﬁnance a takeover; WORKING CAP is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the loan is for working
capital; TERM LOAN is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for term loans; CREDIT LINE is a dummy
variable that takes the value 1 for credit lines; BRIDGE LOAN is a dummy variable that takes the value 1
for bridge loans; GUARANTOR is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the borrower has a guarantor;
SPONSOR is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the borrower has a sponsor; RENEWAL is a dummy
variable indicating if the loan is a renewal of an existing loan;. DIV IDEND REST is a dummy variable that
takes the value 1 if the borrower faces dividend restrictions in connection with that loan; SY NDICATED is
a dummy variable that equals one if the loan is syndicated. Models estimated with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. Robust
standard errors clustered on company in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant
at 1%.
Source: Authors’ computations.
34Table 4. Impact of the bond IPO on loan spreads: Multivariate analysis with matched sample.
a
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AFTER IPO -7.66 -4.55
(14.42) (12.82)
AFTER IGRADE IPO -51.54** -34.56** -45.86** -23.21
(20.81) (16.48) (18.84) (17.02)
AFTER BGRADE IPO -4.32 -3.42 2.86 4.84
(17.57) (16.71) (15.83) (15.46)
AFTER NR IPO 15.26 -5.55 6.69 -12.23
(33.27) (25.09) (31.13) (23.24)
L AGE 31.36* 30.20* 29.37* 30.56* 30.10* 30.76**
(18.29) (18.03) (16.04) (16.95) (16.65) (14.72)
L ASSETS -9.48 -9.16 -8.04 -10.44 -10.02 -9.52
(7.84) (7.78) (6.55) (7.31) (7.23) (6.00)
ROA -13.36 -12.19 4.80 -33.45 -32.91 -8.58
(39.32) (38.71) (31.48) (39.65) (39.10) (30.88)
EARNINGS VOL 0.48 0.47 0.33 0.15 0.14 0.05
(0.31) (0.31) (0.27) (0.32) (0.32) (0.27)
LEVERAGE 21.30 20.27 19.51 26.05 24.89 24.20
(28.74) (28.35) (25.51) (26.04) (25.76) (24.13)
TANGIBLES -5.43 -3.35 -17.55 -13.60 -11.62 -26.27
(19.04) (18.88) (17.97) (16.70) (16.70) (16.33)
INVESTMENTS -37.01 -35.94 -34.76 -40.06 -39.30 -33.41
(37.55) (38.68) (34.25) (32.54) (33.08) (29.23)
ADVERTISING+R&D -39.00 -32.67 -88.93 -55.94 -51.89 -120.30
(111.79) (110.29) (98.96) (108.42) (105.65) (98.51)
L INTEREST COV -13.28** -13.34*** -15.83*** -13.60*** -13.64*** -16.37***
(5.17) (5.11) (4.08) (4.54) (4.48) (3.85)
TREND 5.04** 5.16** 3.89* 4.74** 4.80*** 2.66
(2.28) (2.22) (2.08) (1.87) (1.82) (1.79)
RECESSION 20.31** 20.23** 18.65** 17.52** 17.23** 16.68**
(8.27) (8.28) (7.42) (7.60) (7.64) (6.55)
BBB—AAA SPREAD -26.04* -27.84** -24.45** -21.60* -23.74** -19.28*
(13.64) (13.66) (11.81) (11.85) (11.85) (10.49)
LRELATIONSHIP -1.00 -1.27 -7.56 -2.15 -2.20 -6.96
(5.01) (5.04) (4.94) (4.72) (4.74) (4.94)
L AMOUNT -3.44 -3.80 -2.23
(3.99) (4.02) (4.34)
L MATURITY 1.43 1.12 -3.06
(3.99) (4.01) (3.65)
SECURED 24.06** 23.26** 27.28***
(9.98) (9.88) (9.76)
SENIOR -2.16 -1.83 3.78
(11.13) (11.25) (9.75)
CORPORATE PURP -15.04* -15.75* -13.84*
(8.38) (8.44) (7.71)
Continues on the next page.
35Table 4 (Continued).
a
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
REFINANCE -16.11** -17.06** -15.16**
(8.20) (8.21) (7.67)
TAKEOVER 4.59 3.59 8.91
(9.41) (9.40) (8.55)
WORKING CAPITAL -20.84* -22.01** -9.52
(10.79) (10.82) (10.28)
TERM LOAN 41.10*** 40.39*** 42.06***
(8.65) (8.66) (7.95)
CREDIT LINE 10.58 9.59 11.86
(8.68) (8.67) (7.83)
BRIDGE LOAN 77.00*** 74.32*** 66.25***
(23.35) (23.18) (25.64)
GUARANTOR 6.90 6.36 7.85
(12.32) (12.47) (12.12)
SPONSOR 67.66*** 67.39*** 58.74***
(13.17) (13.22) (11.79)
RENEWAL 9.34 9.69 12.01
(13.71) (13.84) (12.69)
DIVIDENT REST 2.83 2.47 6.56
(5.88) (5.91) (6.28)
SYDNICATED 6.18 6.14 9.09
(9.38) (9.38) (9.96)
Constant 74.36 72.68 103.91*** 104.39 108.35 112.94*
(46.19) (46.45) (37.68) (65.63) (66.12) (61.27)
Observations 2363 2363 2859 2363 2363 2859
R
2 0.85 0.85 0.83 0.87 0.88 0.86
a Dependant variable is LOAN SPREAD, the loan spread at origination over Libor. Models estimated on
our sample of bond IPO ﬁrms and our sample of matched ﬁrms. See the Methodology section for a description
of our matched sample. See Table 3 for the deﬁnitions of control variables. Models estimated with ﬁrm ﬁxed
eﬀects. Robust standard errors clustered on company in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%;
*** signiﬁcant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ computations.
36Table 5. Impact of the bond IPO on loan spreads: eﬀect of ﬁrm ratings.
a
Variables Full sample Matched sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AFTER IGRADE IPO -44.52*** -40.41*** -59.89*** -55.85***
(10.76) (11.10) (22.28) (20.93)
AFTER BBB IPO -49.92*** -69.66**
(15.52) (31.12)
AFTER NON-BBB -24.96* -43.96*
IGRADE IPO (15.15) (24.84)
AFTER BGRADE IPO -23.72* -21.71 -20.13 -18.89 -11.55 -15.58
(14.33) (13.63) (14.39) (27.50) (24.07) (26.96)
AFTER NR IPO 50.30** 41.23** 40.85** 24.55 11.27 8.22
(20.11) (18.03) (18.19) (29.23) (25.50) (25.67)
RATED*AFTER 45.01*** 47.99**
IGRADE IPO (16.84) (22.46)
RATED*AFTER 11.59 4.10
BGRADE IPO (27.24) (30.85)
RATED*AFTER -35.51 -68.53*
NR IPO (33.94) (40.70)
IGRATED*AFTER 27.89** 45.23**
IGRADE IPO (11.94) (21.63)
BGRATED*AFTER 8.94 -2.01
BGRADE IPO (32.88) (39.44)
FIRMS THAT 2.71 -14.06
SWITCH IG/BG (18.96) (22.86)
BBB-RATED*AFTER 34.30** 59.40*
BBB IPO (15.93) (32.23)
OTHER IGRATED 3.10 41.8
AFTER IG IPO (26.50) (42.26)
FIRMS THAT 4.15 -1.30
SWITCH RATING (22.76) (26.99)
L AGE 15.09 14.72 14.66 12.44 11.60 12.48
L ASSETS -7.98** -7.84* -7.76* -7.76 -7.62 -7.51
ROA -62.60*** -62.59*** -62.74*** -41.02 -43.22 -41.80
EARNINGS VOL 2.36 2.36 2.36 0.64** 0.65** 0.65**
LEVERAGE 14.29 14.03 13.83 -0.55 -0.71 0.19
TANGIBLES -18.87* -19.30* -19.25* -18.94 -21.00 -20.28
INVESTMENTS 2.45 3.02 3.10 -16.51 -11.42 -9.50
ADVERTISING+R&D -1.05*** -1.06*** -1.06*** -104.98 -113.29 -113.16
L INTEREST COV -5.66** -5.68** -5.68** -12.40** -12.26** -12.29**
TREND 5.79*** 5.79*** 5.79*** 7.05*** 7.09*** 6.98***
RECESSION 20.65*** 20.92*** 20.93*** 11.49 12.20 12.10
BBB-AAA SPREAD -39.88*** -39.95*** -39.81*** -43.53*** -43.41*** -43.16***
LRELATIONSHIP -5.32** -5.33** -5.34** -3.21 -3.10 -3.18
Observations 8495 8495 8495 2619 2619 2619
R
2 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.84 0.84 0.84
37See notes for Table 4. Standard errors for control variables are omitted in the interest of space. RATED indicates
a ﬁrm had a credit rating before its bong IPO. IGRATED indicates a ﬁrm had an investment grade rating
before its bong IPO. BGRATED indicates a ﬁrm had an below grade rating before its bong IPO. SWITCH
indicates a ﬁrms’ rating before bond IPO did not conform with its bond IPO rating (38 observations).
38Table 6. Gross spreads of IPO bonds.
a
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IPO
(1) 0.19** 0.31*** 0.27*** 0.17** 0.28*** 0.20***
(0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08)
SECOND 0.20*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.12***






L AGE 0.08 0.13 -0.03 0.02 0.07 -0.11
(0.14) (0.14) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.09)
L ASSETS -0.08 -0.07 -0.05 -0.07 -0.06 -0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
ROA 0.17 0.26 0.93 0.12 0.22 0.89
(0.64) (0.66) (0.65) (0.57) (0.58) (0.55)
EARNINGS VOL -0.07 0.11 -0.02 0.11 0.27 0.12
(0.38) (0.42) (0.41) (0.38) (0.42) (0.37)
LEVERAGE 0.17 0.17 -0.04 0.20 0.20 -0.02
(0.21) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.18)
TANGIBLES -0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.03 -0.04 0.01
(0.17) (0.16) (0.10) (0.17) (0.16) (0.10)
ADVERTISING+R&D 0.67 1.27 1.10 0.03 0.55 0.61
(1.53) (1.50) (1.48) (1.47) (1.42) (1.28)
INVESTMENTS 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.22 0.22 0.21
(0.31) (0.31) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.24)
L INTEREST COV -0.08 -0.09 -0.07 -0.11* -0.12** -0.10**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
TIME TREND -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
RECESSION 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.08* 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.12**
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
AFTER 1988 -0.20 -0.20 -0.09 -0.20 -0.19 -0.10
(0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11)
BK MKT SHARE -0.65 -0.74* -0.64** -0.34 -0.42 -0.28
(0.40) (0.38) (0.33) (0.45) (0.43) (0.36)
L AMOUNT 0.07 0.08 -0.03
(0.17) (0.17) (0.15)
L MATURITY 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.32***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
CONSTANT 0.12 -0.11 0.45 -0.71* -0.91** -0.28
Observations 1,191 1,191 1,169 1,186 1,186 1,164
R
2 0.79 0.80 0.81 0.83 0.83 0.85
P value for (1)+(2)=0 0.064 0.120
a Dependent variable is GROSS SPREAD, the underwriting spread of a debt issue measured as the diﬀerence
between the oﬀered amount and the proceeds to the issuer, expressed as a percentage of the oﬀered amount (issue
size); IPO is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the IPO bonds; SECOND is a dummy variable which
takes the value 1 for the second public bond issued by debt IPO ﬁrms; IGRADE is a dummy variable which
takes the value 1 for the investment-grade bonds. See deﬁnitions of ﬁrm controls in Table 1. RECESSION is
a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the bond was issued during a recession; AFTER 1988 is a dummy
variable which takes the value one for the bonds issued in the period post 1988; BK MKT SHARE is the
market share of the underwriter based on the volume of issues; L AMOUNT is the log of the issue amount;
L MATURITY is the log of the issue maturity. Models estimated with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. Robust standard
errors clustered on company in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ computations.
39Table 7. Ex ante credit spreads of IPO bonds.
a
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IPO
(1) 0.52*** 0.59*** 0.69** 0.37** 0.34* 0.47*
(0.19) (0.21) (0.30) (0.16) (0.18) (0.28)
SECOND 0.12 0.04 -0.04 -0.08






L AGE 0.22 0.26 0.11 0.33** 0.32** 0.18
(0.16) (0.17) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.13)
L ASSETS 0.06 0.06 0.14 -0.00 -0.00 0.08
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
ROA -1.80 -1.73 -0.26 -1.78 -1.81 -0.61
(1.22) (1.22) (1.24) (1.15) (1.16) (1.25)
EARNINGS VOL -1.67** -1.55* -1.83* -0.97 -1.01 -1.34
(0.84) (0.89) (1.06) (0.91) (0.90) (1.04)
LEVERAGE 0.91 0.92 0.60 0.53 0.52 0.38
(0.70) (0.70) (0.55) (0.70) (0.70) (0.58)
TANGIBLES -0.59 -0.60 -0.45 -0.61* -0.60* -0.50*
(0.38) (0.38) (0.30) (0.32) (0.32) (0.26)
ADVERTISING+R&D -1.77 -1.39 0.42 -4.00 -4.14 -1.93
(3.50) (3.62) (3.62) (3.11) (3.17) (3.30)
INVESTMENTS 0.07 0.09 0.30 0.24 0.23 0.43
(0.67) (0.68) (0.63) (0.59) (0.59) (0.56)
L INTEREST COV -0.08 -0.09 -0.06 -0.08 -0.08 -0.05
(0.13) (0.13) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.10)
RECESSION 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.31*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.35***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08)
TREASURY SLOPE -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
AAA YIELD -0.06 -0.06 -0.08 -0.13** -0.13** -0.12**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
BBB-AAA SPREAD 0.80*** 0.79*** 0.71*** 0.60*** 0.60*** 0.55***
(0.19) (0.19) (0.16) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17)
BK MKT SHARE -1.11* -1.16* -1.09* -0.85 -0.83 -0.83
(0.66) (0.67) (0.60) (0.62) (0.62) (0.58)
L AMOUNT 0.54** 0.53** 0.37
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
L MATURITY 0.01 0.01 0.05
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
CALLABLE 0.61*** 0.61*** 0.44***
(0.12) (0.12) (0.10)
SINKING FUND 0.55 0.55 0.44
(0.35) (0.35) (0.31)
SHELF -0.17 -0.18 -0.10
(0.11) (0.11) (0.09)
PUT OPTION -0.70*** -0.71*** -0.68***
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
CONSTANT 1.05 0.93 2.33** 1.49* 1.54* 2.37***
Observations 1,328 1,328 1,308 1,328 1,328 1,308
R
2 0.84 0.84 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.88
P value for (1)+(2)=0 0.327 0.833
40a Dependent variable is CREDIT SPREAD, the ex ante credit spread over Treasury with the same maturity
of the bond; IPO is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the IPO bonds; SECOND is a dummy
variable which takes the value 1 for the second public bond issued by debt IPO ﬁrms; IGRADE is a dummy
variable which takes the value 1 for the investment-grade bonds. See deﬁnitions of ﬁrm controls in Table
1. RECESSION is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the bond was issued during a recession;
TREASURY SLOPE is the diﬀerence between the yields of Treasuries with 30 year and 5 year maturities;
AAA Y IELD is the Moody’s index on the yield of triple-A rated bonds; BBB−AAA SPREAD is the diﬀerence
between the Moody’s indexes on the yields of triple-A and triple-B rated bonds; BK MKT SHARE is the
market share of the underwriter based on the volume of issues; L AMOUNT is the log of the issue amount;
L MATURITY is the log of the issue maturity; CALLABLE is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 for
callable bonds; SINKING FUND is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 for bonds with a sinking fund;
SHELF is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 for shelf bonds; PUT OPTION is a dummy variable
which takes the value 1 for bonds with a put option. Models estimated with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. Robust standard
errors clustered on company in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ computations.
41Table 8. Diﬀerence between ex ante yields and market yields at the time of the ﬁrst trade.
a
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IPO
(1) 0.10 0.13* 0.26* 0.11* 0.15** 0.28*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.15) (0.06) (0.06) (0.16)
SECOND 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.12






L AGE -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
L ASSETS -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
ROA 0.05 0.07 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.02
(0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.36) (0.35) (0.35)
EARNINGS VOL 0.21 0.17 0.42 0.38 0.43 0.58
(0.63) (0.63) (0.73) (0.69) (0.69) (0.74)
LEVERAGE 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.12 0.12
(0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
TANGIBLES 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
ADVERTISING+R&D 0.41 0.36 0.49 0.75 0.69 0.67
(1.15) (1.18) (1.15) (1.17) (1.21) (1.18)
INVESTMENTS 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.11
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
L INTEREST COV -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
RECESSION -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19)
TREASURY SLOPE -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
BBB-AAA SPREAD 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.29* 0.29* 0.29*
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15)
BK MKT SHARE -1.15** -1.18** -1.13** -0.91* -0.97* -1.02*
(0.55) (0.53) (0.54) (0.53) (0.51) (0.54)
BK RELATIONSHIP -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
L AMOUNT -0.15 -0.16 -0.16
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
L MATURITY 0.15** 0.16** 0.15**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
CALLABLE 0.05 0.04 0.01
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
SINKING FUND 1.03*** 1.06*** 0.00
(0.10) (0.11) (0.00)
SHELF 0.01 0.03 0.03
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
PUT OPTION -0.16 -0.15 -0.14
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
CONSTANT 0.09 0.05 -0.00 -0.45 -0.51 -0.49
Observations 359 359 357 358 358 356
R
2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.04
P value for (1)+(2) = 0 0.643 0.262
42a Dependent variable is ABN SPREAD, the percentage point diﬀerence between the ex ante yield spread
and the secondary market yield spread when the bond ﬁrst trades provided this occurs within one month
from the issuance date, where these spreads are computed over the Moody’s daily bond yield index with the
same rating of the bond; IPO is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the IPO bonds; SECOND is
a dummy variable which takes the value 1 for the second public bond issued by debt IPO ﬁrms; IGRADE
is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 for the investment-grade bonds. See deﬁnitions of ﬁrm controls
in Table 1. RECESSION is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the bond was issued during a
recession; TREASURY SLOPE is the diﬀerence between the yields of Treasuries with 30 year and 5 year
maturities; BBB −AAA SPREAD is the diﬀerence between the Moody’s indexes on the yields of triple-A and
triple-B rated bonds; BK MKT SHARE is the market share of the underwriter based on the volume of issues;
BK RELATIONSHIP is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the bond IPO underwriter also acquired
the ﬁrm’s last private placement or extended the ﬁrm its last loan prior to its IPO bond); L AMOUNT is the log
of the issue amount; L MATURITY is the log of the issue maturity; CALLABLE is a dummy variable which
takes the value 1 for callable bonds; SINKING FUND is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 for bonds
with a sinking fund; SHELF is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 for shelf bonds; PUT OPTION is
a dummy variable which takes the value 1 for bonds with a put option. Robust standard errors clustered on
company in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ computations.
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